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Security models using access control policies have over the years improved from Role-
based access control (RBAC) to newer models which have added some features like 
support for distributed systems and solving problems in older security policy models such 
as identifying policy conflicts. Access control policies based on hierarchical roles provide 
more flexibility in controlling system resources for users. The policies allow for 
granularity when extended to have both allow and deny permissions as well as weighted 
priority attribute for the rules in the policies. Such flexibility allows administrators to 
succinctly specify access for their system resources but also prone to conflict.  
This study found that conflicts in access control policies were still a problem even in 
recent literature. There have been successful attempts at using algorithms to identify the 
conflicts. However, the conflicts were only identified but not resolved or averted and 
system administrators still had to resolve the policy conflicts manually. This study 
proposed a weighted attribute administration model (WAAM) containing values that feed 
the calculation of a weighted priority attribute. The values are tied to the user, 
hierarchical role, and secured objects in a security model to ease their administration and 
are included in the expression of the access control policy. This study also suggested a 
weighted attribute algorithm (WAA) using these values to resolve any conflicts in the 
access control policies. The proposed solution was demonstrated in a simulation that 
combined the WAAM and WAA. The simulation’s database used WAAM and had data 
records for access control policies, some of which had conflicts. The simulation then 
showed that WAA could both identify and resolve access control policy (ACP) conflicts 
while providing results in sub-second time. The WAA is extensible so implementing 
systems can extend WAA to meet specialized needs. This study shows that ACP conflicts 
can be identified and resolved during authorization of a user into a system. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Background 
Role-based access control (RBAC) has served foundationally for newer models 
that enforce system security at various levels of improvement. Improvements are needed 
in administering security polices (Pérez, Lòpez, Skarmeta, & Pasic, 2010), and detecting 
and resolving system authorization conflicts in distributed systems (Juntapremjitt, 
Fugkeaw, & Manpanpanich, 2008). RBAC is a paradigm commonly accepted in 
enforcing system security because roles provide a way to group features and their 
relationships to users of a system (Sandhu, Coyne, Feinstein, & Youman, 1996; Vaidya, 
Atluri, Warner, & Guo, 2010). It shows improvement over earlier IS security approaches 
like discretionary access control and mandatory access control. RBAC has been used as a 
foundation of studies and has been extended into various models such as CABAC 
(Concrete and Abstract Based Access Control) introduced by Bouzida, Logrippo, and 
Mankovski (2011), and Generalized Temporal Role-Based Access Control (GTRBAC) 
by Joshi, Bertino, and Ghafoor (2005). These are also different from Park and Sandhu’s 
(2004) UCONABC (usage control) which has found success in the business to consumer 
space.  There is El Kalam et al.’s (2003) Organization based access control (OrBAC) 
which uses RBAC as one of its pillars and has proved useful in geospatial research.  
These studies show the acceptance of RBAC and the research that has gone to further 
refine it. 
Within RBAC-based research, policy conflict occurs when the policies satisfied 
by the authorization in a system have actions that are contradictory. If the contradictory 
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access rights are granted to an individual entity, such as a system user, then that user will 
experience the effects of policy conflict which are anomalous system behavior (Jajodia, 
Samarati, Sapino, & Subrahmanian, 2001). 
Policy conflict has since been researched as shown by Wu, Chen, Zhang, and Dai 
(2009) and Fan, Liang, Luo, Bo, and Xia (2011). Wu et al. (2009) compare user security 
policies in matrix groups by using an algorithm against the matrices to detect security 
policy conflicts. According to Wu, et al. (2009), a matrix group is a policy definition 
represented as a matrix. Whenever policies need to be compared to determine conflict, 
they perform matrix operations to determine the conflict. Fan, et al. (2011) propose an 
algorithm, ACPCDM (Access Control Policy Conflict Detection Model), to review the 
policies and identify those that have conflicts. This study goes further than the 
identification of ACP (Access Control Policy) conflict done by Wu et al. (2009) and Fan 
et al. (2011) by finding a way to resolve the policy conflicts using a security 
administration model and an extended algorithm. 
Problem Statement 
According to Wu, Chen, Zhang, and Dai (2009), ACP conflicts occur in situations 
where overlapping event conditions or actions end up being contradictory. Fan, Liang, 
Luo, Bo, and Xia (2011) identified the conflicts as disaccords in the roles that a user is 
assigned. The access control policy (ACP) conflicts occurring in RBAC based studies fall 
into two options; cyclic inheritance and separation of duty (Shafiq, Joshi, Bertino, & 
Ghafoor, 2005). 
RBAC based systems in a distributed environment could end with conflicts in 
their ACPs which would cause a system to behave erratically as it relates to security 
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(Shafiq, Joshi, Bertino, & Ghafoor, 2005). Other studies (Fan, Liang, Luo, Bo, & Xia, 
2011; Wu, Chen, Zhang, & Dai, 2009) were also in agreement that ACP conflicts occur 
in systems and should be resolved. However, attempts to resolve ACP conflicts resulted 
in the automation of detecting conflicts for system administrators to resolve (Fan, et al., 
2011, El Kalam, et al., 2003, Wu, et al., 2011). Shafiq, et al. (2005) proposed a solution 
that would be external to existing systems but would require policy integration and a 
homogenizing process to resolve conflicts. 
Bertino, Catania, Ferrari, and Perlasca (2003) proposed a framework within which 
their algorithm would resolve conflict. The framework containing their process generally 
required that a mapping from an existing system be done and the ACP data imported into 
their tool for comparison to identify ACP conflicts. Once the data was in their 
framework, the ACPs were then compared using C-Datalog, an object oriented 
programing language developed by Greco, Leone, and Rullo (1992). So Bertino, et al. 
(2003) identified the problem as worth researching but provided an external solution that 
required data mapping from existing security models into their framework. Bertino, et al. 
(2003) stated that ACP conflict was a problem but did not attempt to solve it in their 
model; instead they cede to the specifications of the system. 
In more recent research, ACP conflicts in RBAC systems have been studied (Fan, 
et al., 2011; Wu, et al., 2009) showing that ACP conflicts are still worth pursuing. The 
studies by Fan, et al. (2011) and Wu, et al. (2009) are close to this problem though these 
studies’ results are limited to identifying the conflicts for administrators to correct. Fan, 
et al. (2011) algorithm identifies conflicts and also provides detail of the conflict to assist 
the administrators in resolving the conflict. The algorithm proposed by Wu, et al. (2009) 
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to identify conflict suggested an implementation that is abstracted from the secured 
system so that updates to the system were made independently from the security 
algorithm. The algorithms did not offer anything beyond identification of ACP conflict. 
Perez, Lòpez, Skarmeta, and Pasic (2010) provided a XAML (Extensible Application 
Markup Language) –based solution to administer the ACP of a system but neglected 
identifying ACP conflict or providing any options for ACP conflict resolution. This study 
proposed improvements to access control by extending the administration of policies 
shown by Pérez, Lòpez, Skarmeta, and Pasic (2010) and Li and Mao (2007); and 
detecting and resolving conflicts for system authorization in distributed systems (El 
Kalam, Deswarte, Baïna, & Kaaniche, 2007).  
ACP conflicts occur organically in systems over time with cumulative demands 
for information, features, and data access (Fan, Liang, Luo, Bo, & Xia, 2011). These 
ACP conflicts though identified must be resolved manually to maintain the usefulness of 
the system. Resolving conflicts manually is burdensome for administrators who would 
have other tasks to perform. This study looked at ACP conflict in distributed systems and 
proposed a solution to automatically resolve the ACP conflict. There is a lack of a unified 
solution that includes both an administration model and an algorithm in distributed 
systems (Fan, et al., 2011, Oh, Sandhu, & Zhang, 2006, Wu, et al., 2009). The 
administration model provided attributes to be used in the algorithm because none of the 
existing models considered ACP conflict resolution. This study proposed a unified 
solution with an administration model with hierarchical roles as well as an extended 
algorithm to find ACP conflicts and calculate weighted priority attribute to use in 
resolving ACP conflict in distributed systems. 
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Dissertation Goal 
This study brought convergence to the results from previous studies by using an 
administration model and an extensible algorithm to resolve ACP conflict. It proposed 
combining hierarchical roles that would be central to the systems at a high level of 
visibility into an administration model. Additionally, this study proposed that the 
administration model would include attributes to support a weighted priority attribute 
(WPA) for the algorithm to use in finding and resolving ACP conflict. 
This study also proposed that the conflicts in security policies’ permissions and 
prohibitions were avoidable but would need both an administration model of hierarchical 
roles with attributes to calculate WPA named weighted attribute administration model 
(WAAM); and an extended algorithm to resolve any ACP conflicts name weighted 
attribute algorithm (WAA). In this study, the values to calculate WPA were calculated 
using values provided by a system administrator when a user, role, or object record is 
created. The study by Fan, Liang, Luo, Bo, and Xia (2011) used an algorithm in the 
attempt to identify ACP conflict but lets the administrators resolve any conflicts. Using 
the weighted priority attribute would provide an expressive declaration of precedence to 
assist in averting conflict. However should there still be conflict beyond the weighted 
priority, a localized algorithm would resolve any conflict by applying prescribed checks 
against any attributes to be defined within the algorithm.  
The new security administration model improved on the ARBAC02 
(Administrative RBAC ’02) presented by Oh, Sandhu, and Zhang (2006) and bind the 
resulting administrative model with the algorithm. ARBAC02 does not attempt to resolve 
ACP conflict or provide support to resolve ACP conflict. Kern, Schaad, and Moffett 
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(2003) argue that using role hierarchies could be problematic because of directional 
inheritance and inadequately defined relationships between a user’s role and job function. 
Li and Mao (2007) overcome the issues identified by Kern, Schaad, and Moffett (2003) 
with comprehensive design requirements to include flexibility, scalability, acceptability, 
and economy of mechanism. Their solution proposes UARBAC (“Unnamed” 
Administrative Role-Based Access Control) which separates using a role for access 
control from administering a role (Li & Mao, 2007). Bruns, Huth, and Avijit (2011) built 
their study by extending UARBAC by simulating plan synthesis and non-atomic 
administration. None of these administrative models, ARBAC02 and UARBAC, 
addresses conflict resolution (Bruns, Huth, & Avijit, 2011; Li & Mao, 2007; Oh, Sandhu, 
& Zhang, 2006). This study proposed to use UARBAC (Li & Mao, 2007) as foundational 
research while integrating with the conflict resolution algorithm.  
Research Questions 
The following research questions were considered in the course of the 
investigation for this study. The answers to these questions were placed in the outcomes 
section of the conclusion. 
1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of implementing WAAM in a RBAC 
system? 
2. What are the advantages and disadvantages of an RBAC system adopting the 
WAA as part of their use authorization? 
3. Expecting the number of conflicts a systems user has to grow how would the 
proposed WAA resolve ACP conflicts? 
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Relevance and Significance 
Groups Affected by ACP Conflict 
Research has shown that some solutions uncover problems besides the ones being 
solved. An example of this is the Sandhu, Coyne, Feinstein, and Youman (1996) study 
which discussed RBAC in the formative stages and resultant benefits yet identified 
problems such as a lack of analysis in managing role hierarchies on a unified framework.  
The problems identified show that administrators of systems benefiting from RBAC 
would be affected positively as would the users of such systems though they would also 
be exposed to the problems listed (Sandhu, et al. 1996). The conflicts that go unresolved 
would cause the system to misbehave and would affect both users and administrators as 
follows:  
1. Users with ACP conflicts will have the system misbehave such as by denying 
a user access where it is expected (El Kalam, Deswarte, Baïna, & Kaaniche, 
2007; Shafiq, Joshi, Bertino, & Ghafoor, 2005). 
2. Administrators have to spend expensive time researching or troubleshooting 
their systems to find the conflicts whenever such issues arise (Shafiq, Joshi, 
Bertino, & Ghafoor, 2005). 
Benefits of Resolving ACP Conflicts 
For the results of this study wherever implemented, the expectation is that 
proprietors should benefit from less administrative demands, better user efficacy, and an 
overall simplification of authorization in the security model. For the affected users, the 
system would be more useful and their usage more pleasant (El Kalam, Deswarte, Baïna, 
& Kaaniche, 2007; Shafiq, Joshi, Bertino, & Ghafoor, 2005). The users should also have 
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a better guarantee of access to pertinent data that would otherwise be denied in the event 
of an unresolved conflict (Kuang & Ibrahim, 2009).  
This study anticipates these benefits for the users because the access to secured 
system features and objects would better reflect their administratively prescribed access 
to the system. The administrators who prescribe a system’s access would benefit (Shafiq, 
Joshi, Bertino, & Ghafoor, 2005) because they can adjust the ACP proactively in 
response to monitoring the authorization logs and making any administrative changes 
without having frustrated users making inquiries. 
Promise of Resolution 
Reviewing the studies in the context of RBAC-based distributed systems would 
provide a methodology to better administer security in distributed systems in a way not 
addressed by studies in the reviewed literature. Reeder, Bauer, Cranor, Reiter, and Vaniea 
(2009) show that using single-level roles for their ACP, conflicts can be resolved using 
their algorithm. Many systems use hierarchical policies to manage ACP increasing the 
complexity needed to administer them and to resolve conflicts that may arise (Damiani & 
Silvestri, 2008; Muppavarapu, Pereira, & Chung, 2010). This complexity is perhaps why 
most of the algorithms only go as far as finding the conflict but this study overcomes this 
complexity by resolving conflicts at the ACP level rather than higher in the hierarchy.   
Addition to Knowledgebase 
While OrBAC only suggests a solution for resolving conflict using an algorithm 
based on possibilistic logic, it does so without an administration model (El Kalam, et al., 
2003).  Abdunabi, Ray, and France (2013) propose using spatio-temporal constraints in 
determining users’ ACP but do not address conflict resolution. The solution this study 
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proposes looks to go beyond the literature by resolving conflicts by utilizing both an 
administration model and a complementing algorithm that also works in distributed 
systems. The success by Reeder, Bauer, Cranor, Reiter, and Vaniea (2009) in resolving 
conflict through an algorithm, though in a different context—a file system rather than a 
distributed system—shows that success in resolving ACP conflict is achievable for this 
study. 
The reviewed literature shows attempts in ACP resolving conflicts using 
algorithms with some success such as (Reeder, Bauer, Cranor, Reiter, & Vaniea, 2009), 
even in distributed systems (Fan, Liang, Luo, Bo, & Xia, 2011), but lack an 
administration model. The lack of using both an administration model and an algorithm 
to resolve conflict from the available literature is worth pursuing. Researching an 
administration model in the RBAC space that concludes in implementation solution 
should be a welcome addition. 
Generalizability of Results 
The proposed results of this study, an administration model with an algorithm in 
an inheritable component, was expected to be easy for practitioners to incorporate into 
their design and architecture. Should they be in the formative stages of implementing 
their distributed system, the data model of the distributed system could extend its security 
database objects to include the fields in the data model. Alternatively, they could add 
database objects as provided in the data model and integrate to the rest of their existing 
data model. The administrator of the system or the implementer would have to carefully 
review their existing administration model to ensure that the attributes required by 
WAAM are accounted for in the database. These would be both in the storage data 
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objects as well as objects for retrieving ACP so the attribute values would be available to 
the algorithm. The algorithm was then encapsulated in a component that could be used in 
the system’s authentication processes. 
For those with a distributed system already implemented but not yet homogenized 
into a single security model, the results from this study would allow for the adoption of 
the administration into their existing data model. The changes needed would include 
creating new database storage object or extending existing ones to accommodate the data 
model as well as changes to a corresponding administrative interface to manage the ACP 
data. Implementing the algorithm for existing systems would also include altering 
components in the security module to use or implement the resultant component of this 
study. 
For systems in formative stages, such as design, the model could be used as the 
security data model, or extended by adding attributes to existing database objects to meet 
WAA’s needs. Likewise, the algorithm was placed in a compiled component that could 
be referenced in the system’s authorization component or module.  
Originality 
This study proposed a synergistic approach of both an administration model and a 
conflict resolution algorithm (using both hierarchical roles and a weighted priority 
attribute). The studies that have algorithms in resolving policy conflicts such as OrRBAC 
(El Kalam, et al., 2003) do not use hierarchical roles while others (Fan, Liang, Luo, Bo, 
& Xia, 2011) only identify the policy conflicts. Reeder, Bauer, Cranor, Reiter, and 
Vaniea (2009) discuss their specificity precedence improvements for the conflict 
resolution in a Windows file system simulation. Building on the Reeder, et al. (2009) 
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study which had conflict resolution was useful for this study to adopt for applications in a 
distributed system environment (DSE). The administration model in this study borrowed 
liberally from the study by Dekker, Crompton, and Etalle (2008) and extended it to 
include the calculation for weighted priority attribute (WPA) to be used in the algorithm 
for conflict resolution. 
Barriers and Issues 
 Availability of a distributed system to use as a subject for this study may be 
challenging to find because such systems in practice are usually proprietary. The 
stakeholders of such proprietary systems may not consider kindly an outsider inspecting 
their system to see if it is performing satisfactorily. Similar to the articles by 
Juntapremjitt, Fugkeaw, and Manpanpanich (2008) and Reeder, Bauer, Cranor, Reiter, 
and Vaniea (2009), this study employed a simulated environment containing distributed 
applications with online user interfaces implementing the security algorithm for the 
study. 
 In order to prove that the solution would work there were iterations of designs 
resulting in an administration model and algorithm to identify and resolve ACP conflict. 
The complimentary designs for the administration model and algorithm were used in the 
simulation to show how they would work where implemented. The component 
implementing the algorithm was iteratively checked in the simulated environment to 
ensure performance was acceptable. Generally, systems with specific tasks visible to a 
user have to perform within acceptable time constraints. Applying the security model to 
existing systems would add to the tasks to be performed within the time constraints. So 
performance of the model for authorization is critical to acceptance by practitioners. To 
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overcome the challenge of finding existing systems, building a simulation of a distributed 
system provided a baseline for the algorithm’s ability to solve conflicts when they occur. 
In the simulated environment, creating the ACP data required creating records via 
a generated script; however the script generation could not reliably create ACP conflict. 
The automated ACP script generation proved challenging to have ACP conflicts because 
creating each ACP entry script used known record identifiers so no conflict was created 
for the script. Manually created script entries were appended to the automated script in 
order to create conflicted ACP.  
Without a baseline with which to compare the performance of the conflict 
resolution portion of the algorithm, the metrics recorded to determine performance were 
collected over multiple runs through the algorithm. The metrics, such as the number of 
runs, the time taken for the runs, the average number of runs, and the number of ACP 
evaluated; were then collected and aggregated to find statistical values to represent 
performance of the algorithm. 
Limitations and Delimitations 
Limitations 
An administration model with an algorithm containing an inheritable component 
in the proposed results is expected to be easy for practitioners to incorporate into their 
system design and architecture. The natural limitation of WAA was how extensively the 
implementers would like to extend the algorithm. 
Using a role hierarchy may not directly conform to an organizations’ 
administrative concept (Kearn, Schaad, & Moffett, 2003). The large systems which apply 
13 
 
their organization’s administrative concepts may end up modifying an RBAC schema 
structure so that it fits their situation. 
Evaluation as far as resolving conflict could be compared to an algorithm that 
resolves conflict such as the one discussed by Reeder, Bauer, Cranor, Reiter, and Vaniea 
(2009) though the conflicts there are not based on RBAC. Each system implementing this 
model would still need a sound design in its security model as well as sound security 
practices so that the system is not subject to abuse by negligent users (Karp, Haury, & 
Davis, 2009). 
Delimitations 
The natural limitation of how extensively the implementers would like to extend 
the algorithm would also depend on availability of skilled staff or other resources 
necessary to extend the algorithm. This study showed how the proposed model and 
algorithm would be implemented but did not go into the implementation of the inherited 
components of the extended algorithm. 
Should the proposed role hierarchy in the model not directly conform to an 
organizations’ administrative concept (Kearn, Schaad, & Moffett, 2003) there would 
have to be some accommodations to benefit from this study’s solution. The model’s 
implementation would be one where the objects used in storing and retrieving the ACP 
values for users’ authorization would have to be altered to provide the attributes needed 
by the proposed algorithm to resolve conflict. For example, should the roles not have a 
hierarchy from which to retrieve the role attribute for the algorithm, an alternative 
attribute would be a ranking of the roles. This would still provide the attribution need for 
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the algorithm to determine which role should get more weight when resolving any 
conflicts. 
There was a challenge to finding the right fit for comparison with the proposed 
solution because it identified and resolved conflict in systems with RBAC based schema. 
The other RBAC models and algorithms only identified the conflicts (Fan, Liang, Luo, 
Bo, & Xia, 2011; Wu, Chen, Zhang, and Dai, 2009). The model by Fan, et al. (2011) 
proved a close match to compare the conflict identification portion of the solution. The 
conflict resolution could not directly be compared with what was provided by Reeder, 
Bauer, Cranor, Reiter, and Vaniea (2009) because of the differences in managing access 
for files in a windows system versus ACP in a RBAC system. Therefore the ACP conflict 
resolution portion was measured for accuracy and performance without comparison to 
results from an existing study.  
Definition of Terms 
ACP – Access Control Policy – this is a systems definition of which object can be 
accessed by a use and could also define what level of access. A user would generally 
have a set of these provided from the authorization process. 
Authentication – this is the process by which a user identifies himself to the system 
proving a right to use a system (Karp, Haury, & Davis, 2009); such as by providing a user 
name (public key) and a password (private key). 
Authorization – this is the process by which a system’s security module determines which 
features or parts of the system a user can access as well as the level of access (Karp, et 
al., 2009) such as read-only or read-write. 
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Policy Conflict – occurs when policies satisfied by the authorization in a system have 
actions that are contradictory (Jajodia, Samarati, Sapino, & Subrahmanian, 2001; Wu, 
Chen, Zhang, & Dai 2009; Fan, Liang, Luo, Bo, & Xia, 2011). 
RBAC – Role-based Access Control – this a methodology of controlling access to parts of 
a large system based on the roles that a user is assigned. 
Request – this is the action-reaction when a user performs a gesture on a part of the use 
interface and the system responds accordingly. 
User Session – this is an interactive period beginning when a user authenticates by 
signing into a system until they are signed out by a process or by signing out themselves. 
Summary 
 RBAC has served as foundational to systems security and newer systems use it at 
various levels of improvement. Within RBAC-based research, ACP conflict occurs in 
systems whereby within a user’s set of ACPs there are contradictory actions allowed on 
an object causing the system to misbehave. There have been attempts to automatically 
identify these conflicts but there is a lack of research showing how to automatically 
resolve the ACP conflict using an administration model and algorithm. This study 
proposed a solution to overcome this problem. The users and administrators of systems 
implementing the proposed solution would benefit by having consistent behavior and 
fewer demands directed to the administrators to identify and correct system anomalies 
resulting from ACP conflict. 
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Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature 
Introduction 
 This chapter reviewed published studies in the RBAC space showing the 
problems solved over time as well as the prevailing problems. This section reviewed 
some Early RBAC studies, some of the Improvements over RBAC that have happened 
over the years, some Residual Problems in RBAC that are still lingering in this research 
space, and Adaptation of Results from the previous studies that were useful in 
formulating the results.  
Early RBAC 
Some studies such as Bertino, Bettini, Ferrari, and Samarati (1996) considered 
access control and discussed temporal access and used discretionary access control 
(DAC) along with mandatory access control (MAC) as foundations. RBAC, depending 
on the implementation could be either but has elements of both MAC and DAC.  
Mandatory Access Control 
MAC is where the access is provided by the data being secured and the clearance 
level of the user (Atluri, Jajodia, & Bertino, 1997). It was generally used in multi-level 
secure military systems where preference is to security over confidentiality (Ferraiolo & 
Kuhn, 1992). 
Discretionary Access Control 
Downs, Rub, Kung, and Jordan (1985) describe DAC as a means of restricting 
access to objects based on the identity of the subjects or the groups to which they belong. 
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Users of a system with security based on DAC allowed a user to grant or deny privileges 
to system objects that they control without an administrator’s intervention (Ferraiolo & 
Kuhn, 1992).  
Role-Based Access Control 
Organizations have a wide array of needs in terms of security policies of their 
systems that would be difficult to meet by either MAC or DAC alone (Ferraiolo & Kuhn, 
1992). The introduction of RBAC brought about benefits such as ease of administration 
by matching ACP to a role rather than directly to a user (Sandhu, Coyne, Feinstein, & 
Youman, 1996). This administration of roles would have to be done by a trained 
administrator rather than by passing permissions from one user to another in DAC 
(Ferraiolo & Kuhn, 1992). Sandhu, Coyne, Feinstein, and Youman (1996) defined RBAC 
as a kind of access control whereby only authorized users are given access to specific 
data or resources in a system.  
Within RBAC the role hierarchy is a constraint in that when a child role is granted 
access to an object, the parent roles also receive that permission. Also, a user assigned to 
a particular role automatically receives all the descendant roles in the hierarchy (Sandhu, 
Coyne, Feinstein, & Youman, 1996). They further identified lack of information 
regarding both configuration and constraints in RBAC systems as problems worth 
studying (Sandhu, Coyne, Feinstein, & Youman, 1996).   
Improvements over RBAC 
Administrative RBAC ‘97 
The study by Sandhu, Bhamidipati, Coyne, Ganta, and Youman (1997) proposed 
ARBAC97 (Administrative RBAC ’97) to administer the access control of an RBAC-
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based system. They posited that with enterprise size systems, the roles could number into 
the hundreds or thousands so they would need RBAC to manage the roles in the RBAC 
(Sandhu, et al., 1997). 
Organizational RBAC 
Bertino, Bettini, Ferrari, and Samarati (1996) considered dynamism in the model 
but would still need new algorithms to help with decentralization and periodic 
authorization. El Kalam, et al. (2003) shows the use of RBAC in an organizational 
context and calls their resulting model OrBAC. With organization structure usually 
having a hierarchy, OrBAC accommodates handling the organizational hierarchies in 
their ACPs. OrBAC has provided the basis for other research studies (Capolsini & 
Gabillon, 2009; El Kalam, Deswarte, Baïna, & Kaaniche, 2007) around access control 
rules based on temporal data such as time and location that use OrBAC and are 
referenced in other research with some improvement. El Kalam, et al. (2003) which 
proposed OrBAC has improvement over RBAC by adding hierarchy and organizational 
context to roles. The El Kalam, et al. (2003) study shows OrBAC as an improvement 
based on how the model is setup though still lacking in administration of policies and 
enforcement when the policies are violated. 
Integrated Policy 
Shafiq, Joshi, Bertino, and Ghafoor (2005) proposes an integrated policy for 
RBAC systems in what they describe as multi-domain environment, similar to this 
study’s distributed system, because different applications collaborate as they perform 
their tasks. Shafiq, et al. (2005) describe their approach using an integer programming to 
homogenize the ACP across the different applications. The administrators would have to 
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make trade-offs to find a balance between integration into homogeneous polices or 
autonomy of the distributed systems (Shafiq, et al., 2005). 
Generalized Temporal RBAC and Geographical RBAC 
The RBAC study by Joshi, Bertino, and Ghafoor (2005) shows that roles are 
important though still inadequate so they proposed Generalized Temporal Role-Based 
Access Control (GTRBAC) that brought some improvements over RBAC. Joshi, et al. 
(2005) augmented RBAC with time as a dynamic component in the GTRBAC model 
alongside the user context to determine access control in a hospital system. The 
GTRBAC model would also improve over RBAC in expressiveness and usability (Joshi, 
et al., 2005). The GTRBAC would be further improved with GEORBAC (GEOgraphical 
Role Based Access Control) which takes into account the location of the subject and 
object when considering access control (Damiani, Bertino, Catania, & Perlasca, 2007). 
The ACP incorporates the location of the user as the subject, as well as the bound 
location of the object (Damiani, Bertino, Catania, & Perlasca, 2007). Cruz, Gjomemo, 
Lin, and Orsini (2008) describe a similar access control system that uses global 
positioning system to determine location and derive permissions based on other role 
attributes the user may have. 
Concrete and Abstract RBAC 
CABAC, presented by Bouzida, Logrippo, and Mankovski (2011), uses predicate 
logic that results in granting and revoking access to users based on the changes in static 
data and a dynamic data context. CABAC attempts to combine rules into contexts though 
it has trouble when there are conflicts in the policies (Bouzida, Logrippo, & Mankovski, 
2011).  
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PolyOrBAC 
Damiani and Sylvestri (2008) mention challenges in accommodating systems with 
distributed architecture as they developed the GEORBAC model. However, El Kalam, 
Deswarte, Baïna, and Kaaniche (2007) accommodate systems with distributed 
architecture by employing web services to manage access control for distributed systems 
in a collaborative context using PolyOrBAC. An improvement to PolyOrBAC in 
expressiveness is the distributed-RBAC that provides single-sign-on to distributed 
systems using XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) which is based 
on XAML (Juntapremjitt, Fugkeaw, & Manpanpanich, 2008). Introducing distributed-
RBAC brings dynamism in ACP by emphasizing a decentralized implementation 
(Juntapremjitt, Fugkeaw, & Manpanpanich, 2008). Similarly, Pérez, Lòpez, Skarmeta, 
and Pasic (2010) bring about a concept whereby the system administrators delegate some 
of the administrative tasks to agents at the application level in a distributed system. Fan, 
Liang, Luo, Bo, and Xia (2011) propose an algorithm to find conflicts for the 
administrators to solve—providing a benefit for the administrators to resolve the conflicts 
whenever identified. The studies that describe the newer models provide improvement 
over the older RBAC showing a maturing process for the access control discipline though 
there is still some space worth investigating.  
Administrative RBAC 
Some of the improvements in the RBAC administration by Oh, Sandhu, and 
Zhang (2006) propose ARBAC02 (Administrative RBAC ’02), which improves over 
ARBAC97 by using bottom-up inheritance. ARBAC02 introduces user pool and 
permission pool; user pools are special roles that contain permissions at the central 
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system and permission pools that are roles at the distributed system (Oh, Sandhu, & 
Zhang, 2006). Users in systems using ARBAC02 would have to be assigned to both a 
user pool and a permission pool. ARBAC02 supports hierarchical roles so permissions 
are assigned to the lower policies and inherited up the hierarchy (Oh, Sandhu, & Zhang, 
2006). Further improvements in RBAC administration are discussed by Li and Mao 
(2007) in UARBAC which uses parameters and units in defining its permissions so they 
can be delegated to improve scalability. Dekker, Crompton, and Etalle (2008) discuss the 
administration of RBAC in distributed systems. They discuss administration in 
heterogeneous distributed systems and use a method that begins with applying a security 
policy in each of the distributed systems in a distributed systems environment (Dekker, 
Crompton, & Etalle, 2008). 
NBAC and ZBAC 
In the study by Karp, Haury, and Davis (2009), the older models were presented 
as NBAC (autheNtication-Based Access Control) which has some of the RBAC solutions 
but also brings up its own issues. One of the NBAC issues they (Karp, Haury, & Davis, 
2009) identify is role explosion. Role explosion is a situation whereby a system ends up 
with overly granular roles or roles that are very similar. They present a solution to the 
issues they present in ZBAC (authoriZation-Based Access Control) which restricts users 
to specific domains (Karp, Haury, & Davis, 2009). 
RBAC96 
Jiong and Chen-hua (2012) base their study on RBAC96 and propose a consistent 
constraint schema to help administrators in RBAC systems and categorize the constraint 
conflicts as either external or internal. Their study defines external conflicts as those 
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occurring “when the configuration of RBAC does not satisfy the constraints defined in 
the system” (Jion and Chen-hua, 2012, p2) and internal conflicts occurring when “two or 
more constraints are deemed incompatible with each other” (Jion and Chen-hua, 2012, 
p2). The approach that Jiong and Chen-hua (2012) offered identified the constraint for 
resolution but would need to be automated into an algorithm. The solution from this 
study considered that assigning conflicting permissions to a role would be prevented in a 
user interface that limits the administrator to the selection of a single permission when 
creating an ACP so internal conflicts according to Jiong and Chen-hua (2012) would not 
occur. The external conflict is what would be considered in this study because a user 
could have direct permissions to an object and be assigned roles that have conflicting 
permissions to the same object. This study goes beyond what Jiong and Chen-hua (2012) 
proposed because the administration model for this study overcomes the internal conflict 
because one role may not have multiple permissions for the same object.  
Spatially Aware RBAC 
Damiani, Bertino, Catania, and Perlasca (2007) proposed improvements to RBAC 
by adding roles and location constraints in determining the access to be granted to the 
user by a system. They discussed location-based services and mobile applications 
creating a demand for spatially aware systems. They extend role-based access control 
(RBAC) by. This extension forms GEO-RBAC (Geographic RBAC) which added a 
geographically derived spatial role to the user. Rather than just use the user’s location, 
they split position into logical and real whereby the real position is based on geography 
and the logical position is computed from the real position to provide some extension to 
the spatial location. They also separated the duties of the user by role and also employer 
23 
 
hierarchies to simplify role definition. This article does not cover the administrative 
operations or moving spatiotemporal extents (Damiani, Bertino, Catania, & Perlasca, 
2007). 
As use of mobile access to systems is expected to grow, the use of derived 
contextual attributes such as geographic location of a user, the local time of the system or 
of the user could be part of future studies related to resolving ACP conflict (Abdunabi, 
Ray, & France, 2013). A future study could find the possibility of involving attributes 
available from a mobile user such as location to determine how to resolve any ACP 
conflicts. 
UARBAC and ACPCDM 
        Li and Mao (2007) introduced UARBAC essentially as a way to use RBAC to 
administer RBAC systems. RBAC was presented as policy neutral, meaning it could be 
configured to enforce different kinds of policies in simultaneously. UARBAC, as discussed 
by Li and Mao (2007), described a tuple as follows: 〈𝐶, 𝑂𝐵𝐽𝑆, 𝐴𝑀〉 where: C is a finite 
set of object classes the system supports, for example, {user, role}; OBJS is a mapping 
function for C that returns a set of object names such that OBJS(user) returns a set of all 
possible user names; and AM which is a function that maps each class to a predefined set 
of access modes, for example AM(user) returns {empower, admin} (Li & Mao, 2007). 
Fan, Liang, Luo, Bo, and Xia (2011) showed that policy conflict was an existing 
problem in current systems. They proposed an algorithm to review an entire authorization 
policy and pointing out the discrepancy which they called ACPCDM (ACP Conflict 
Detection Model). They used XACML for their policy expression (Fan, et al., 2011). 
ACPCDM identified two types of policy conflict: separation of duty and cyclic 
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inheritance. Both of these conflicts were identified using ACPCDM which they proposed. 
They identify conflict using ACPCDM model which ran against ACP listed in two files. 
Each file represented ACP from different domains that need to be merged. Their conflict 
detection includes: removing duplicates, reasoning which determines the conflicts, and 
analyzing the results (Fan, et al., 2011). For this study we considered different systems in 
a DSE. 
Residual Problems 
Policy Conflicts 
Moffett and Sloman (1994) raise issues regarding management of policies and 
point out a need to analyze resulting conflicts in the policies but only present a theoretical 
model leaning toward automated management. A later study (Schaad & Moffett, 2002) 
posited that resolving the conflict of polices was in delegating authority to the 
decentralized applications within the distributed system. Shu, Yang, and Arenas (2009) 
declare that the problem of policy conflicts exists. Their article proposes a method for a 
conflict detection solution which they implement in a prototype (Shu, Yang, & Arenas, 
2009). Policy conflicts were studied more recently by Wu, Chen, Zhang, and Dai (2009) 
who contract security policies into matrix groups and then use their algorithm against the 
matrices in order to detect ACP conflicts. The checks they used are computationally 
intense and could be improved in reducing the calculations used. Fan, Liang, Luo, Bo, 
and Xia (2011) propose an algorithm to review the policies and identify the policies that 
have conflicts; however they defer to the administrator to resolve the conflict. 
The RBAC based studies, while providing improvement, either avoid addressing 
policy conflict resolution or work within the prescriptions of a prior model. Conflicts, 
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according to Wu, Chen, Zhang, and Dai (2009), occur in a situation where overlapping 
events conditions or actions and any two or more of the actions end up being 
contradictory. Fan, Liang, Luo, Bo, and Xia (2011) identifies the conflicts as disaccords 
in the roles between permissions and the representative schema representation of a 
system’s ACPs. Their proposed ACP conflict detection model (ACPCDM) contributes 
identification of the policy conflicts but do not address policy conflict resolution. 
The study by Schaad and Moffett (2002) posited that solving the conflict of 
polices was in separation of duty controls to the decentralized applications within the 
distributed system and integration of administrative mechanisms. The ability to centralize 
the administrative mechanisms would make it easier to administer the system from a 
single place though decentralizing some administrative function to the systems where 
they are relevant would be useful to consider for this study. Abdunabi and Ray (2010) 
suggested that developers of the systems were more likely to use technical concepts that 
were easier to understand and administrators more likely to use automated approaches. 
This could involve running the ACP conflict identification algorithm off hours or when 
system usage is low (Abdunabi & Ray, 2010) 
Global Policy 
The homogenous unification into a global policy as shown by Shafiq, Joshi, 
Bertino, and Ghafoor (2005) is largely a process implementation to pool together the 
policies of the systems in a multi-domain environment. A multi-domain environment is a 
collection of cooperating single domain systems (Shafiq, et al., 2005). The study also 
states that the underlying systems must be RBAC based before it could be useful.  
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The multi-domain environment (Shafiq, Joshi, Bertino, & Ghafoor, 2005) was 
very similar to this study’s distributed system environment and some elements were 
incorporated such as integrating the ACP names across the applications in the system. 
Reeder, Bauer, Cranor, Reiter, and Vaniea (2009) discuss specificity precedence for the 
conflict resolution in their Windows file system simulation that could be useful in this 
study if adopted for applications in a distributed system. 
ACP Conflict in Collaborative Systems 
The studies reviewed show some improvement but still have some problems 
worth investigating: Bertino, Catania, Ferrari, and Perlasca (2003) state that ACP conflict 
is a problem but do not attempt to solve it in their model; instead they cede conflict 
resolution to the specification of the system. The PolyOrBAC model needs to improve in 
detecting and resolving conflicts in security policies in collaborative systems (El Kalam, 
et al, 2007). Pérez, Lòpez, Skarmeta, and Pasic (2010) introduced delegated 
administration using XACML but without support for distributed systems (Pérez, Lòpez, 
Skarmeta, & Pasic, 2010). D-RBAC, presented by Juntapremjitt, Fugkeaw, and 
Manpanpanich (2008) still does not address conflict resolution over PolyOrBAC. 
CABAC attempts to combine rules into contexts though it has trouble when there are 
conflicts in the policies (Bouzida, Logrippo, & Mankovski, 2011).  
According to Shafiq, Joshi, Bertino, and Ghafoor (2005), the conflicts in ACP are 
classified into four types:  
1. Modality conflicts – where positive and negative policies exist in an 
authorization;  
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2. Multiple management – occurs when administrators specify conflicting 
authorizations for the same roles. 
3. Cyclic inheritance – occurs when a subject lower in the hierarchy ends 
up with permissions of a subject higher in the hierarchy. 
4. Separation of duty – prevents access of an object when there would be 
conflict of interest. 
Each of these has different causes and may be addressed separately and independently. 
The conflicts that occur under RBAC are cyclic inheritance and separation of duty 
(Shafiq, Joshi, Bertino, & Ghafoor, 2005) and are the conflicts covered by this study. 
Damiani and Sylvestri (2008) mentioned challenges in accommodating systems 
with distributed architecture as they extended the GEORBAC model to be motion-aware. 
The article still struggled with the separation of duty conflicts. This was an attempt to 
mitigate the conflicts by adding constraints in the creation of ACP but admit they were 
not able to resolve the conflict (Damiani & Sylvestri, 2008). 
The study by Pérez, Lòpez, Skarmeta, and Pasic (2010) proposed a concept of 
administrative delegation whereby the system administrators of a distributed system 
delegate some of the administrative tasks to users responsible at the application level who 
only have to deal with ACPs at the application level. The concept of administrative 
delegation could be useful for this study as administrative tasks are performed by 
administrators who are functionally closer to the tasks or objects being secured. 
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Access Conflict Resolution 
 The studies based on RBAC that recognize conflicted ACP as a problem only 
went as far as identifying the conflict. The study by Reeder, Bauer, Cranor, Reiter, and 
Vaniea (2009) showed that conflict in access policies could be resolved using an 
algorithm. In their study, they simulated the file access policies on Windows and chose to 
improve them because of conflicts that came out of divergent polices. They described 
ACP as consisting of a set of rules under which users are allowed to access system 
resources (Reeder, et al., 2009).  
ACP conflict occurs when the user cannot get access to a resource when an action 
is allowed in one policy but denied in another (Reeder, et al., 2009). Without conflict 
resolution a system would behave unexpectedly. Their study used a Windows 
environment which, to mitigate the potentially erratic behavior during ACP conflict, gave 
precedence to the deny policies should there be a conflict. 
Adaptation of Results 
The study by Schaad and Moffett (2002) posited that solving the conflict of 
polices would be in separation of duty controls to the decentralized applications within a 
distributed system and integration of administrative mechanisms. The ability to centralize 
the administrative mechanisms would make it easier to administer the system from a 
single place. Abdunabi and Ray (2010) suggested that developers of the systems more 
likely used technical concepts that were easier to understand and administrators more 
likely to use automated approaches. This involved running the ACP conflict identification 
algorithm off hours or when system usage is low (Abdunabi & Ray, 2010) 
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The multi-domain environment (Shafiq, Joshi, Bertino, & Ghafoor, 2005) was 
very similar to this study’s distributed system though some elements were incorporated 
such as integrating the ACP names across the applications in the system. Reeder, Bauer, 
Cranor, Reiter, and Vaniea (2009) discussed specificity precedence for the conflict 
resolution in their Windows file system simulation that could be useful in this study if 
adopted for applications in a distributed system. 
The study by Pérez, Lòpez, Skarmeta, and Pasic (2010) proposes a concept of 
administrative delegation whereby the system administrators of a distributed system 
delegate some of the administrative tasks to users responsible at the application level who 
only have to deal with ACPs at the application level. The concept of administrative 
delegation could be useful for this study as administrative tasks are performed by 
administrators who are functionally closer to the tasks or objects being secured. 
Summary 
This chapter reviewed available literature from various periods in the 
development of access control in systems. The improvements in access control from 
various studies were reviewed from MAC (Ferraiolo & Kuhn, 1992) and DAC (Downs, 
Rub, Kung, & Jordan, 1985), which formed the foundation of RBAC, and continuing the 
review with UARBAC (Li & Mao, 2007) and ACPCDM (Fan, Liang, Luo, Bo, & Xia, 
2011) which were foundational for this study. The residual problems that were identified 
from the literature like ACP conflict in collaborative systems of which this study 
proposed a solution and how the results could be adapted. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
Overview  
 This chapter discussed the algorithm proposed by this study to answer the 
identified research questions. This quantitative study used metrics measuring 
performance of the weighted attribute algorithm and weighted attribute administration 
model for ACP operations during authorization into a system. The metrics collected from 
the simulation that implemented both WAA and WAAM included the number of ACP 
evaluated by WAA; the number of runs through the algorithm where each run 
represented a user being authorized into a RBAC-based system; the delay added to 
authorization by the algorithm; and the number of ACP conflicts resolved vis a vis the 
known conflicts for each user. The delay added to the authorization was considered for 
performance which the comparison of the number of known ACP conflicts with those 
identified was WAA’s identification accuracy. This chapter then discussed the 
procedures employed to evaluate WAA’s accuracy and performance, the performance 
metrics used, and how these metrics were obtained from an implementation of the 
algorithm using a simulation. 
Research Method  
 This study proposed the weighted attribute algorithm (WAA) and employed the 
quantitative method to help answer the research questions identified in Chapter 1. The 
overall method was to analyze ACP conflicts in RBAC-based systems then design, 
develop, and implement a simulation of WAA as a way to collect evidence supporting the 
ability to identify and resolve ACP conflict accurately during user authorization. 
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WAA needed some attributes be added to the ACP described by Li and Mao 
(2007) in order to resolve ACP conflicts. Implementing WAA required introducing 
attributes available to the ACP resulting in the weighted attribute administration model 
(WAAM). The design for WAAM, discussed below, encapsulates the attributes added to 
UARBAC (Li & Mao, 2007). To evaluate WAA and WAAM, metrics for accuracy and 
performance were collected to see the viability.  
 The procedures employed during this investigation follow the patterns used by 
Fan, et al. (2011), Reeder, et al. (2009), and by Li and Mao (2007). This study used the 
following procedures in designing WAA to identify and resolve ACP conflict along with 
its supporting WAAM: 
 to identify the metrics needed to evaluate the performance of the algorithm 
 to design the simulation environment containing WAA and ACPCDM (Fan, et al., 
2011) to collect evidence for performance evaluation in accuracy and efficiency 
 to create the seed dataset, and  
 to report metrics for performance evaluation in accuracy and efficiency. 
Designing the Weighted Attribute Algorithm 
 The design for WAA had three primary objectives in providing RBAC-based 
hierarchical systems a solution for ACP conflict resolution: first identify the conflicts to 
be resolved, second was to resolve the ACP conflicts, and third was to provide simple 
implementation for administrators who choose WAA for their conflict resolution. These 
objectives, as accommodated in WAA, are in the flowchart in Figure 1 below. The basis 
of the conflict resolution is the weighed priority attribute (WPA) which was derived from 
32 
 
the ACP attributes: user position and role hierarchy. Figure 1 below is broken down into 
numbered steps such as 1.0 and 2.0 with steps at a lower level of granularity numbered as 
4.4 or 4.6.1. 
  
Figure 1. Authorization Flowchart using WAA for Conflict Resolution  
 Designing WAA required that each ACP contain attributes to derive WPA. These 
attributes: user position, role hierarchy level, and is-auto-resolve flag are used in the 
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comparative portions of the algorithm. The is-auto-resolve flag is an indicator to tell 
WAA whether to attempt to resolve the ACP conflict. This allows for administrators to 
deem ACP conflicts on specific objects not be resolved by the algorithm. This is useful if 
ACPs of an object containing sensitive data, like access to monetary transactions are in 
conflict, they would be left in conflict and an administrator’ intervention needed to 
correct the ACPs in conflict. 
UARBAC, as discussed by Li and Mao (2007), described a tuple as follows: 
〈𝐶, 𝑂𝐵𝐽𝑆, 𝐴𝑀〉 where: C is a finite set of object classes the system supports, for example, 
{user, role}; OBJS is a mapping function for C that returns a set of object names such 
that OBJS(user) returns a set of all possible user names; and AM which is a function that 
maps each class to a predefined set of access modes, for example AM(user) returns 
{empower, admin} (Li & Mao, 2007). For this study WAA required that the expected 
tuple of ACP be extended to: 〈𝐶, 𝑂𝐵𝐽𝑆, 𝐴𝑀, 𝑊𝑃𝐴𝐹〉 where WPAF is the function to 
determine the weighted priority attribute (WPA). For instance, WPAF(role, user) would 
return a numeric value for WPA. The WPA is derived as shown in step 4.6.1.3 of Figure 
1 from the user position and role hierarchy level attributes discussed further in the design 
for WAAM below. The WPAF(role, user) function used the following formula to 
calculate WPA:  
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑘1(𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝑘2 (𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑒𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙) 
For the calculation, k1 and k2 are positive non-zero configurable constants where k1 ≠ k2. 
Based on their knowledge of a system’s usage, the administrator would determine that k1 
which modifies the user weight is of higher importance than k2.  
34 
 
 The WAA is designed to easily integrate into an existing system where a set of 
user ACP is provided for user authorization as shown in Step 1.0 of Figure 1. Getting the 
set of user ACP would be from the local database if the user is authenticated locally or 
from a database in another system in the environment. This achieved enough flexibility to 
work for both regardless of where the user’s ACP are obtained from so long as they have 
the attributes required to calculate WPA for conflict resolution. 
Designing Allowance for Extensible Algorithm 
 WAA was designed to be extensible so that implementers could augment the 
conflict resolution for those ACPs that are still in conflict after running WAA. This 
option which is the extensible algorithm in Step 4.10.3 of Figure 1 provided flexibility to 
the implementers who could, by adding or deriving other attributes from the ACP. This 
option allowed for implementing systems to add further logic to resolve any ACP 
conflicts that WAA cannot resolve. For example, an implementer could have an attribute 
on the ACP based on the time the role was created, and could use this attribute in their 
implementation of extending WAA. 
 The design to integrate with an extensible algorithm called for the implementation 
of the extensible algorithm to subscribe to a WAA interface and be added to the 
configuration as an available extension to WAA. It would also be limited to being 
compiled similarly to the implementation of WAA, so that if Java was used the extensible 
algorithm could be extended seamlessly if it were implemented in Java as well. It would 
still be possible to use different technologies like Microsoft .Net and Java together but 
would add a logical layer of interoperability between the different technologies. This 
design recommended that any extensible algorithm be implemented in like technologies, 
35 
 
such that a Microsoft .Net implementation of WAA would be extended by an 
implementation in Microsoft .Net. The simulation used for this study was compiled using 
Microsoft .Net. 
Designing the Weighted Attribute Administration Model 
 This design for Weighted Attribute Administration Model (WAAM) was made to 
complement WAA by providing attribution to the set of ACPs used to authorize a user 
into a system. The WAAM extended the UARBAC model discussed by Li and Mao 
(2007) as well as hierarchical roles (Damiani, Bertino, Catania, & Perlasca, 2007). This 
study combined these concepts into an administration model including adding attributes 
from which the weighted priority attribute (WPA) would be derived. Two options were 
considered to add attributes for WPA: add new objects with the desired attributes, or 
extend existing database objects. 
The option to add new objects while plausible would be more challenging to 
maintain making it less desirable for administrators. Adding new objects to a database to 
contain the attributes for WPA would allow existing related and dependent client objects 
to work as before though access to the new objects would require new stored procedures 
or access queries. Extending existing objects with the ACP attributes with default values 
would allow for backwards compatibility though existing access stored procedure or 
queries would have to be altered to accommodate the new attributes. Adding new objects 
would also require three new objects that have a 1:1 relationship with existing objects; for 
instance, the entity containing the RoleHierearchy would have a 1:1 relationship with the 
Role entity and may have to be updated in concert. For this study the attributes that 
WAAM provided were added to existing database objects so that queries for user ACP 
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would only be extended by adding the additional fields rather than extending 
authorization by joining additional objects. The entity relation diagram representing the 
WAAM is presented in Figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2. ERD of the Weighted Attribute Administration Model 
 The design for WAAM called for three fields to be added to an existing RBAC-
based database implementation. These fields would allow for easy implementation for an 
existing system because existing stored procedures and queries just need to access a new 
field rather than build new queries. These are the three attributes that were used by WAA: 
1. The is-auto-resolved attribute which tells the algorithm whether to consider 
the ACP for resolution when there is a conflict.  
2. The hierarchy level used in calculating the role hierarchy factor in 
determining WPA. 
3. The position of user used in calculating the user position factor in determining 
WPA. 
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The is-auto-resolved flag only needs to be updated along with a record in the 
SecurableObject object and all ACP associated with the securable object would share that 
attribute. WAA used the is-auto-resolved flag to determine whether to calculate WPA. 
Consideration for the Distributed System Environment 
A distributed system environment (DSE) is one consisting of multiple systems 
that a user can authenticate once and be authorized to perform tasks on any of the systems 
based on their ACP. The layout of the distributed system considered is shown in Figure 3 
which shows a DSE with WAA implemented in the satellite systems. The primary and 
secondary systems are shown to have extended WAA while Node-1 is without an 
extension. The Node-n represents any other system that is part of the DSE that 
implements WAA and has an option to extend WAA at its administrators’ discretion and 
implementation of their choosing.  
 
Figure 3. Location of WAA in a Distributed System 
A local system, for this study, is one where the user record of the authenticating user 
exists. For example, a user attempting to use the system in Node-1 would make Node-1 
the local system for that user’s session. When authorizing at Node-1 in Figure 3 where 
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the user already exists, the ACPs would be retrieved from the local system database in 
Node-1. The central user repository would contain all user records for the systems in the 
DSE, if so configured. When no central repository is configured in the DSE, the primary 
node would function as the central user repository for authentication purposes. The 
secondary node could be any node in the system but provides redundancy for the primary 
node. The extension is available only where implemented by the administrators and could 
differ from one local system to the next depending on additional attributes and logic as 
they see fit. 
 For a DSE to implement WAA fully, each system would have to extend their 
ACP to include the attributes to support WAA by also implementing WAAM. If a DSE 
only has some of its constituent systems with WAA, the benefits of ACP conflict 
resolution would only apply when both the authenticating system and authorizing system 
have WAA and WAAM. The systems where the ACPs are obtained that do not 
implement WAAM would be unable to provide the needed attributes to calculate WPA.  
 The logic to identify the system from which to obtain a user’s ACPs for 
authorization in a distributed environment were encapsulated in Step 1.0 of the flowchart 
in Figure 1. The scenarios considered were:  
1. Authorizing a user in the local system where the user’s ACPs exist  
2. Authorizing where a user is not in the local system but: 
a. is in the primary node of the DSE 
b. is in a central user repository of the DSE 
These scenarios were covered in Figure 4 below:   
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Figure 4. Determining the Source of User ACP 
The ACP retrieval, as shown in Figure 4, would obtain all the ACP from the system 
where the authentication was attempted. When considering the second scenario where 
authentication against a local system fails, authentication would then be attempted against 
the primary node (or central user repository, depending on how the DSE is constituted). 
Upon successful authentication at the primary node—or central user repository, the ACPs 
would be retrieved from there and authorization performed at the local system. 
 Consider the same steps in the flow for retrieving the user’s ACP shown in Figure 
4 (Step 1.0 of Figure 1); they are all outside of the WAA. This study determined that 
where a user’s set of ACP lies is of little significance to WAA in calculating WPA 
because the presence of the attributes determined whether WAA could be used. 
Designing the Simulation Environment 
 The simulation environment was designed to accommodate both WAA from this 
study and ACPCDM proposed by Fan et al. (2011). ACPCDM was included to establish 
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a baseline for identifying ACP conflicts of a user during authorization. Figure 5 below 
(corresponding with Figure 1 beginning in Step 2.0) shows how the logical components 
were arranged to fit in the simulation environment. 
 
Figure 5. Logical Design for the Simulation Environment 
The implementation of the DSE is limited to a single node on the DSE. Having both 
algorithms in the simulation facilitated use of common data in the user, object, and role 
entities which constituted ACP. Each run through the algorithm had a user to obtain a set 
of ACP from the common database where the metrics were also collected. These 
algorithms were implemented into a combined logic pattern as shown in Figure 6.  
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Figure 6. Design of the Simulation  
 This simulation environment contained single database implementing WAAM 
for all the ACP data for runs through the algorithms. The script used to create the tables is 
in Appendix A:. Appendices B and C contain the scripts used to implement the view and 
stored procedures respectively. Appendix D contains the list of tools and related 
components as shown in Figure 6 that facilitated executing the simulation application.  
Preparing the Seed Data used for Runs through WAA and ACPCDM 
In order to create the data to support the ACPs for the simulation, the code in 
Appendix H was used to create all the data in the objects needed to support creating 
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users, roles, objects, and their relationships for the simulation. This was run as a console 
application to prepare the simulation environment for the algorithm runs to collect the 
metrics needed for the study. The program created a script containing SQL Insert 
statements for all the data used for the runs. The approach populated objects in the 
compiled code corresponding to database objects and then serialized the objects into SQL 
Insert statements. The statements were then run into the database to create the user, roles, 
objects, and ACP data to support the runs through either algorithm. 
The same sets of ACP were used for identifying conflicts using ACPCDM, and 
for both identifying and resolving conflicts using WAA. For each run, a different system 
user was used providing a different set of ACPs. When changing the algorithm the same 
set of users was used guaranteeing that metrics collected are from the same sets of ACP 
for the runs. The decision point during the runs to determine which algorithm to use was 
placed in the configuration file where the value was edited to the desired algorithm. The 
configuration was placed as follows in order to run the ACPCDM algorithm: 
  <appSettings> 
    <add key="Algorithm" value="Acpcdm"/> 
  </appSettings> 
Figure 7. The Configuration Setting when running ACPCDM 
The algorithm was set as follows for the weighted attribute algorithm: 
  <appSettings> 
    <add key="Algorithm" value ="WeightedAttribute"/> 
  </appSettings> 
Figure 8. The Configuration Setting when running the Weighted Attribute Algorithm 
This configuration option was simple enough to toggle the algorithm to use for a set of 
runs through an algorithm in the simulation. 
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Collecting Metrics from Runs through WAA and ACPCDM 
 There were 100 users selected from the database to be used for runs through each 
algorithm. From the runs through the algorithms performance and accuracy metrics were 
collected to facilitate comparison and analysis of the algorithms. Each user record had its 
own set of ACP data based on the roles assigned to the user and the objects accessible to 
those roles and their descendants. There were also ACP records that were obtained from a 
user record having direct access to a secured object. So obtaining ACP for the 100 
different users provided variety in the sets of user ACP, in agreement with what Kothari 
(2004) called the principle of local control. 
Each run collected these values for use as inputs to derive the performance and 
accuracy metrics:  
Table 1. The Values Collected from each Run  
 Value Collected from Run  WAA ACPCDM 
1.  Number of ACP for the user evaluated in the run x x 
2.  Known number of conflicts x x 
3.  Number of conflicts identified x x 
4.  Number of conflicts resolved x  
5.  Time taken to identify conflict x x 
6.  Time taken to resolve conflict x  
These collected values had the expectation that for each run the authenticated user had 
their own set of ACP to use for authorization. The author tracked the number of ACP 
evaluated which was expected to vary by user. From the user’s ACPs we also obtained 
the number of known conflicts among the ACPs. The expectation was that the number of 
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known conflicts is greater than or equal to the number of the conflicts resolved. The time 
taken to identify conflict was also tracked for both algorithms to facilitate comparison 
between the two algorithms. The time taken to resolve conflict and the number of 
conflicts resolved could only be collected from WAA because ACPCDM does not 
resolve ACP conflict. The time for identifying and resolving ACP conflict were added to 
show the delay that running either algorithm would add to a system that places either 
algorithm in their authorization module.  
The values as shown in Table 1 were collected from runs through both algorithms. 
Once collected for both WAA and ACPCDM algorithms, they were aggregated into the 
performance metrics shown in Table 2. These metrics collected from the runs through the 
algorithms are as follows: 
Table 2. The Collection of Metrics from the Simulation 
 Metric Collected  WAA ACPCDM 
1.  Number of runs x x 
2.  Total time taken for the runs (T) x x 
3.  Average time per run – average delay 
added to the authorization  
x x 
4.  Number of ACP evaluated (N)  x x 
5.  Average number of ACPs per run x x 
6.  Known number of conflicts (Ca) x x 
7.  Number of conflicts identified (Ci) x x 
8.  Total time taken to identify conflicts (Ti) x x 
9.  Average time to identify conflicts per ACP x x 
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Table 2. The Collection of Metrics from the Simulation 
 Metric Collected  WAA ACPCDM 
10.  Number of conflicts resolved (Cr) x 
 
11.  Time taken to resolve ACP conflict (Tr) x 
 
12.  Average time taken per ACP conflict x 
 
13.  Average Resolve time taken per run x 
 
The simulation was configured to use one algorithm during execution. For either 
algorithm the configuration was set for one of the algorithms as shown in Figure 7 or 
Figure 8. The application for the simulation ran in a MS Windows environment from the 
command prompt. Then following the logic in Figure 6 the metrics for Table 2 were 
collected as follows: 
1. Number of runs – this metric is a count of how many times an algorithm was executed 
during a simulation run. Each of the runs consisted of a single user’s authorization 
process. 
2. Total time taken for the runs (T) – this is a sum of the time taken for all the runs 
beginning after retrieving the set of ACP of the user and running through the 
algorithm. 
3. Average time per run (average delay added to the authorization) – this was 
determined by the dividing the total time (T) by the number of runs. 
4. Number of ACP evaluated (N) – this was the total number of ACPs evaluated from 
each run through the algorithm. 
5. Average number of ACPs per run – this is the number of ACPs evaluated divided by 
the number of runs through the algorithm. 
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6. Known number of conflicts (Ca) – this is the number of ACPs created with conflicts to 
represent the conflicts that would occur in systems. 
7. Number of conflicts identified (Ci) – this represents the number of conflicted ACPs 
that the algorithm identified during the runs. 
8. Total time taken to identify conflicts (Ti) – this is the total of all the time that the 
algorithm took to identify the ACP conflicts for each run. 
9. Average time to identify conflicts per ACP – this metric considered the time it took to 
identify ACP conflicts over the number of ACPs considered for all the runs. 
10. Number of conflicts resolved (Cr) – this counted how many ACP conflicts were 
resolved. 
11. Time taken to resolve ACP conflict (Tr) – this tracked all the time taken to resolve 
ACP conflict for all the runs. 
12. Average time taken per ACP conflict – this considered the time taken to resolve 
conflicts divided by the number of ACP. 
13. Average Resolve time taken per run – this was calculated from the Tr over the number 
of runs to determine how the average time taken for ACP conflict resolution for each 
run. 
From these metrics in Table 2 the study obtained the following: accuracy of the 
algorithm and the performance of the authorization process while using the algorithm. 
The performance of the algorithm was from tracking the number of conflicts resolved per 
run as well as the delay each run added to authorizing a user. The accuracy of the 
algorithm compared the number of conflicts identified to that of known conflicts for each 
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run as well as the conflicts resolved relative to those identified. Thus, we have the 
following working definitions: 
1. Accuracy for conflict identification: 𝐴𝑖 =
𝐶𝑖
𝐶𝑎
  Where:  
a. Ai is the accuracy for identifying ACP conflict 
b. Ci is the number of conflicts identified 
c. Ca is the number of known conflicts 
2. Accuracy for conflict resolution: 𝐴𝑟 =
𝐶𝑟
𝐶𝑖
  Where:  
a. Ar is the accuracy for resolving ACP conflict 
b. Ci is the number of conflicts identified 
c. Cr is the number of conflicts resolved  
3. Performance of the algorithm 𝑃 =
𝑇𝑖+𝑇𝑟
𝑁
 where: 
a. Ti is the time taken to identify conflict 
b. Tr is the timer taken to resolve conflict 
c. N is the number of runs 
Formats for Presenting Results 
 The results of the study proved that the WAAM and WAA provided an approach 
that would solve ACP conflict in RBAC systems. The performance and accuracy results 
were presented comparing ACPCDM with WAA for all data points relevant to 
identifying ACP conflict. Further results for performance and accuracy of resolving ACP 
conflict only pertained to WAA. The administrator interaction with the WAAM was 
presented in narrative form to show the sequence of events required to create and update 
the weighted attributes, and logic of the conclusion. 
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Resource Specifications 
 In order to collect performance and accuracy metrics from the runs through the 
algorithms the author set up a computing environment with a RDBMS to implement 
WAAM and containing user and ACP records, and an IDE to contain the WAA logic and 
necessary components to communicate with the database. The simulation for a node in a 
DSE was represented on one PC containing the user data and ACP for authorization. (A 
DSE with multiple nodes would require that upon user authentication, the ACP for the 
user would be retrieved from the authenticating node using the DSE connectivity. The 
connectivity between the nodes could be achieved over a LAN/WAN. The ACP for the 
user could be retrieved either directly from the remote database or via API on the 
authenticating node.) For this effort a personal computer with the following features was 
used.  
Hardware 
 One ASUS Q550L Notebook PC with a single Intel’s Core i7-4500 2.39 GHz 
processor was used for this study. It had 8.0 GB of RAM and over 700GB of free space 
on the hard drive. The runs in the simulation were performed while the PC was plugged 
into direct current rather than using battery power.  
Software 
 The software used comprised of the following:  
 Operating system: Microsoft’s Windows 8.1 running as a 64-bit system  
 The languages used were T-SQL for the database and C# for the compiled code 
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 The relational database was Microsoft SQL Server 2012 - 11.0.2218.0 (X64) 
Express Edition (64-bit). This also provided the SQL Server Management Studio 
which is an IDE (integrated development environment)  
 The integrated development environment (IDE) consisted of MS Visual Studio 
2012 (Shell Integrated) version 11.0.20727.1 RTMREL. This was used for all the 
programming tasks for the compiled portion of the simulation. 
 These available components used to perform required tasks for the simulation to 
run as an application as well as to simulate runs through the algorithm: 
o MS .Net Runtime 4.5.51641 – necessary to use the tools needed for rapid 
development using the Visual Studio IDE. 
o System Data – is a dynamic link library provided by Microsoft to connect 
to the database. This was used to encapsulate all the requests to the 
database to read and write data. 
o MS Quality Tools Unit Test Framework – these provided a unit testing 
feature which was used to target the necessary parts of the simulation for 
the algorithm to collect data. 
 A logging mechanism was created as part of this study because to collect the data 
to meet the objective of calculating performance and accuracy metrics. The data 
in this log also had to be easily retrievable and used in a spreadsheet for analysis. 
So part of the implementation of WAA and WAAM in this environment was to 
collect data at selected points (such as after ACP conflict identification and at 
completion) during each run through the authorization process and logged into 
one record at the conclusion of each run. These data collected in the 
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AuthenticationLog table (see Appendix E for database implementation) 
corresponded with the performance and accuracy metrics in Table 1.  
 Documentation of the results was done using Microsoft Office 2010 by copying 
the SQL query results into a spreadsheet in MS Excel. 
Summary 
 The research methodology described the procedures essential to this research 
process and how the WAA and supporting WAAM were designed. Following the 
procedures also provided the performance and accuracy metrics for qualitative analysis 
for WAA and ACPCDM. Following the procedures provided was enough to achieve the 
same results from the algorithm in either a single system or in a distributed system 
environment. 
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Chapter 4 
Results 
 This chapter presents the results obtained from following the procedures outlined 
in Chapter 3. Following those procedures, including making runs through the algorithms, 
this study collected performance metrics from runs through WAA and ACPCDM. This 
chapter discusses these metrics along with the findings from analyzing them. 
Data Analysis 
 The performance values collected from each run through the algorithm provided 
details from which we could draw some conclusions when analyzing summary of the 
metrics from the entire dataset. This section discussed general observations from the 
results, performance of the algorithms, accuracy, and ease of use from the administrator. 
General Observations of the Seed Data used for the Runs 
 The data used for the runs was common for both algorithms so that any 
comparisons in performance and accuracy were from the same inputs. An example of a 
user’s set of ACP used for one of the runs is shown in Appendix G:. It shows most of the 
ACPs for a user who was assigned roles which in turn had access to objects, as well as 
access assigned directly to the user where there was no role. From the user’s ACP in 
Appendix G:, a sample of conflicted ACP was extracted and shown in Table 3 below: 
Table 3. Example of ACPs in conflict 
Object 
Id 
Object 
Name 
Access 
Mode 
Is Auto 
Resolved 
Position 
Rank 
Position 
Name 
Role 
Name 
Hierarchy 
Level 
98 Object -  98 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  35 1 
98 Object -  98 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  75 3 
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The data in Table 3 was from the ACP list of a single user instance that that was 
subscribed to multiple roles. The expectation here was that the actual person assigned this 
user instance only had one user account to authenticate into the system. The ACP in 
Table 3 showed that two of the roles that the user is subscribed to have access to the same 
object, however the access to the object are not in agreement causing ACP conflict. 
There were metrics that were common to the runs of both the algorithms in the 
investigation. These are listed in Table 4 below. 
Table 4. The Common Summary Metrics Collected from the Runs 
Metric Value 
Number of Runs 100 
Total number of ACP processed 23,644 
Average ACP per run 236 
Minimum ACP count in the runs 69 
Maximum ACP count for the runs 964 
Median of the ACP count for the runs 182 
The values collected according to Table 1 are in Appendices E and F and are summarized 
in Table 5 below. 
 
Table 5. The Metrics Collected from the Comparing the Algorithms 
 Metric Collected WAA ACPCDM 
1.  Number of runs 100 100 
2.  Total time taken for the runs (T) 36.5122s 1.672s 
3.  Average time per run 0.3651s 1.672x10-2s 
4.  Number of ACP Evaluated (N) 23,644 23,644 
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Table 5. The Metrics Collected from the Comparing the Algorithms 
 Metric Collected WAA ACPCDM 
5.  Known number of conflicts (Ca) 5,866 5,866 
6.  Number of conflicts identified (Ci) 5,866 5,866 
7.  Total time taken to identify conflicts (Ti) 0.2201s 0.2117s 
8.  Average time to identify conflicts per ACP 3.7521x10-5s 3.6089x10-5s 
9.  Number of conflicts resolved (Cr) 5,683  
10.  Total time taken to resolve ACP conflict (Tr) 34.7956s  
11.  Average time taken per ACP conflict 6.1227x10-3s  
12.  Average resolve time taken per run 0.3479s  
13.  Average delay added to authorization 0.3502s 2.12x10-3s 
These metrics show how the runs through the two algorithms compared.  
Performance of the Algorithms 
 The algorithms were designed to be part of a system’s user authorization process 
so any time taken to run through the algorithm was considered an additional delay to the 
authorization. Table 6 represents the delay when the algorithms were used. 
Table 6. Comparison of Delay added to Authorization Process 
Metric Collected WAA ACPCDM 
Total time taken to identify conflicts (Ti) 0.2201s 0.2117s 
Average time to identify conflicts per run 2.201 x10
-3
s 2.12x10
-3
s 
Average time to identify conflicts per ACP 3.7521x10
-5
s 3.6089x10
-5
s 
Total time taken to resolve ACP conflict (Tr) 34.7956s  
Average time to resolve ACP conflict per run 0.348s  
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Table 6. Comparison of Delay added to Authorization Process 
Metric Collected WAA ACPCDM 
Average delay added to authorization 0.3502s 2.12x10
-3
s 
 
Comparing the delay added to authorization when all that is required is identifying the 
conflicts shows that on average ACPCDM (2.12x10
-3
s) is marginally faster than WAA 
(2.201x10
-3
s) by 8.1x10
-5
s. When considering the conflict resolution which WAA 
provided the average overall delay added to authorization is 0.3502s. 
Table 7. The Summary Metrics Collected from the Weighted Attribute Algorithm 
 ACPs in 
Run 
Conflicts 
Found 
Conflicts Found 
and Resolved 
Delay Added to 
Authorization Time 
Average 236 58.66 56.83 0.3502s 
Minimum 69 7 7 0.0395s 
Maximum 964 199 197 1.4162s 
Median 182 47 45 0.2866s 
Looking at these same metrics but classifying the user based on how many ACP the user 
had, there was a direct correlation between the number of ACP that a user had and the 
delay that would be added to authorization. The delay added to authorization is the sum 
of the time taken to identify the conflict and the time to resolve the conflict. 
Table 8. The Delay Added to Authorization by WAA by on User ACP Count 
User ACP 
Count 
Number 
of Users ACP 
Conflict 
Actual 
Conflict 
Resolved 
Average Delay 
per User 
<= 100 12 1050 164 155 0.1066s 
101 - 200 44 6672 1538 1467 0.2112s 
201 - 300 29 7073 1970 1897 0.4429s 
301 - 400 8 2668 801 785 0.5437s 
>400 7 6181 1393 1379 1.2495s 
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Accuracy in Identifying Conflicts for WAA and ACPCDM 
 The target for accuracy in identifying ACP conflicts was 100%. The accuracy was 
obtained by comparing the actual conflict and the conflicts identified. Using the values 
from Table 5, the accuracy results for WAA and ACPCDM are shown below. 
Table 9. Accuracy Comparison of ACP Conflict Identification 
Formula for Accuracy of 
Identifying Conflicted ACP 
WAA ACPCDM 
Known number of conflicts (Ca) 5,866 5,866 
Number of conflicts identified (Ci) 5,866 5,866 
Ai =
Ci
Ca
 
100% 100% 
The accuracy from both algorithms is comparable and shows that WAA was able to 
identify the ACP conflicts as well as ACPCDM so systems adopting WAA would still 
obtain the desired accuracy. 
Accuracy in Resolving Conflicts using WAA 
 The accuracy score desired was 100% resolution for all conflicts identified though 
the results as shown in Table 10 below are different. 
Table 10. Overall Accuracy of ACP Conflict Resolution 
Accuracy of Identifying Conflicted ACP WAA 
Number of conflicts identified (Ci) 
5,866 
Number of conflicts resolved (Cr) 
5,683 
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Accuracy of Identifying Conflicted ACP WAA 
Conflict resolution accuracy 𝐴𝑟 =
𝐶𝑟
𝐶𝑖
 96.98% 
The accuracy shows that about 3% of conflicts were not resolved by WAA. The ACP 
from objects with the is-auto-resolved flag set to false were ignored from resolution by 
WAA and but were logged for the administrator. 
Looking into the accuracy of ACP conflict resolution further suggested that ACP 
conflicts would be more prominent with users with a lower number of ACP as shown in 
Table 11 below. The table has the number of ACP a user would have classified into 
bands of 100. 
Table 11. Accuracy of ACP Conflict Resolution by User ACP 
User ACP 
Count Range 
Number of 
Users 
ACP 
Count 
Conflict 
Actual 
Conflict 
Identified 
Conflict 
Resolved 
Resolve 
Accuracy 
0 - 100 12 1050 164 164 155 94.512% 
101 - 200 44 6672 1538 1538 1467 95.384% 
201 - 300 29 7073 1970 1970 1897 96.294% 
301 - 400 8 2668 801 801 785 98.002% 
>400 7 6181 1393 1393 1379 98.995% 
From the accuracy metrics collected, the users with significantly higher ACP had higher 
conflict resolution accuracy. 
Findings 
 After following the procedures for the study and performing the analysis above, 
the findings are: that there is a delay added to the authorization process, there are benefits 
of implementing WAA. The benefits of having ACP conflicts resolved were considered 
against the delay experienced in the authentication process. 
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The Delay added by using WAA in User Authorization 
 Using WAA for ACP conflict resolution added delay of 0.3502s on average to 
user authorizations. The expectation for this delay is that it would continue to decrease as 
the administrators correct the ACP conflicts. Because of this average delay that WAA 
would add to a system’s authorization, the author recommended that WAA be applied at 
the beginning of a session rather than at each request. For research question (RQ) 1, we 
found that implementing WAAM in isolation did not provide any benefits to a system 
and that WAA would also need to be implemented. 
 As the system grows, there is an expectation that there will be new objects, roles, 
and users causing the ACP in the system to grow. Looking at RQ 2, WAA from the study 
would still be usable because, the ACPs can be processed by WAA at 2.201 x10
-3
s per 
ACP. The ACP sets ranging in size from 69 to 964 per user were processed during 
authorization with the median ACP set being 182. This wide range shows that there is 
room for ACP counts to grow and still provide ample performance using the current 
WAA design and configuration. If there are too many ACP for WAA to process in time 
that is acceptably for the users, then the option to consider would be to run WAA as part 
of administrative tasks instead as part of each authentication. 
User Benefits of using WAA 
 The systems that implement WAA in their authorization process will provide 
ACP sets that are free of conflict. The benefit to the users would be expected behavior 
with the removal of system anomalies resulting from ACP conflict. Using WAA provides 
users with a working set of ACP without conflicts as any ACP conflicts encountered were 
either resolved or removed from the user’s ACPs. 
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Administrator Benefits of using WAA and WAAM 
The administrator of the systems that has implemented WAA will benefit from 
knowing which ACPs need correcting by monitoring the ACP conflict log. Responding to 
the ACP conflicts recorded in the logs provided by WAAM could be an additional task 
for the administrators who did not have any ACP conflict monitoring. Considering RQ 2, 
WAA logs the conflicts from the user authorizations so that the administrators would 
have access to the ACPs that are constituted in conflict. The administrators can then 
formulate options to correct the configurations to be free from conflict. The 
administrators can then formulate options to correct the configurations to be free from 
conflict. 
Another anticipated gain from using WAA was to have fewer users requesting 
their access to be corrected by the administrator. Correcting the conflict would improve 
the system because users will have their ACP conflicts corrected providing access to the 
system without having the system behavior altered by ACP conflict. Correcting the ACP 
conflicts proactively by the administrator would reduce the number of ACP conflict for 
each user. 
Summary of Results 
 This chapter reviewed the findings from the analysis performed in this study from 
the metrics that were collected from runs through WAA. There were comparisons to 
ACPCDM in ACP conflict identification in which both algorithms scored 100% in 
accurately identified each ACP conflict. The difference in performance for WAA in ACP 
conflict identification from that of ACPCDM, taking 8.1x10
-5
s longer per user 
authorization, was negligible.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
Overview 
 This chapter begins with a review of the idea and goals of the study along with the 
investigation of the research questions. Also provided is a summary of the analysis and 
conclusions from the study. The chapter concludes with recommendations for future 
studies, implications of the study, and summary of contributions. 
The study began with the idea that as systems get larger administrators of these 
systems would, in the course of their administrative activities, inadvertently create 
conflicts in the ACP of the system. The conflicts then cause the system to misbehave 
when the users affected by the ACP conflict attempt to use the system and their ACPs 
have conflict. This study looked at ACP conflict in RBAC-based distributed systems and 
proposed a solution to automatically resolve the ACP conflict. The literature available 
was lacking a unified solution that includes both an administration model and an 
algorithm in distributed systems. The study by Oh, Sandhu, & Zhang (2006) showed an 
administration model but did not use hierarchical roles like WAAM. The studies by Fan, 
Liang, Luo, Bo, and Xia (2011) and Wu, Chen, Zhang, and Dai (2009) show use of 
algorithms to identify ACP conflict but do not resolve them like WAA. This study sought 
a solution to this problem and documented the results of the investigation of WAAM and 
WAA. 
With studies that showed that ACP conflict detection was possible in RBAC (Fan 
et al., 2011) and would be logged for administrators to review and take appropriate 
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action. The study by Reeder, Bauer, Cranor, Reiter, and Vaniea (2009) showed that 
access conflicts are resolvable in a file access setting so the possibility of having ACP 
conflicts resolved in the RBAC-based system would be next step in the natural 
progression in studying access control. 
 This study sought a solution to resolve ACP conflict in RBAC systems in a DSE 
where conflicts were expected as part of the growth in usage systems over time. The 
approach used a simulation to prove that implementing WAA and WAAM would be 
sufficient to both identify and resolve ACP conflict. This approach of using a simulation 
to show results was used before by Reeder, Bauer, Cranor, Reiter, and Vaniea (2009). 
Further this study also included in its simulation ACPCDM (Fan, Liang, Luo, Bo, & Xia, 
2011) which was an algorithm to identify ACP conflict. Including the ACPCDM in the 
simulation allowed for metrics to be collected from the same set of seed data and the 
metrics for analysis and comparison.  
 The results observed from the simulation showed that as far as identifying ACP 
conflict, WAA was comparable to ACPCDM with seemingly negligible difference in 
performance. The accuracy for identifying the ACP conflicts was identical so the metrics 
collected for conflict resolution distinguished WAA from other algorithms like 
ACPCDM (Fan, et al., 2011) and (Wu, Chen, Zhang, and Dai, 2009) which only 
identified ACP conflict. 
This study also proposed that the conflicts in security policies’ permissions and 
prohibitions were avoidable but would need both an administration model of hierarchical 
roles with a weighted priority attribute, and an extended algorithm to resolve resulting 
conflicts. In this study, the WPA was calculated using values provided by a system 
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administrator when a user, role, or object record was created. The study by Fan, Liang, 
Luo, Bo, and Xia (2011) used an algorithm in the attempt to identify ACP conflict but 
lets the administrators resolve any conflicts. Using the weighted priority attribute 
provided an expressive declaration of precedence to assist in averting conflict. However 
if there still was any conflict beyond the weighted priority, an algorithm extending WAA 
could be used in a manner localized to the implementing system in the DSE. 
 The goal of the study was to propose improvements to the administration of ACP 
and to aid in detecting and resolving ACP conflicts in RBAC systems. This was 
accomplished by introducing attributes to the role hierarchy and user position objects 
used to create the ACP; and having the values from those new attributes used to calculate 
the WPA when there is conflict in a user’s ACP. To that end WAAM and WAA in the 
simulation environment showed that while the conflicts were identified, not all conflicts 
are adequately resolvable using the proposed WAA using only the WPA. Also, for 
security reasons some conflicts were configured so that the authorization would not 
delegate the conflict resolution for WAA to resolve by setting the is-auto-resolved flag to 
false. 
Outcomes 
 Investigating the data from the simulation provided the following results for the 
research questions from Chapter 1. These questions formed the basis of WAA to resolve 
ACP conflicts in large RBAC systems. 
Research Question 1 
The question was: What are the advantages and disadvantages of implementing 
WAAM in a RBAC system? 
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1. Implementing WAAM in an RBAC system provides the system with the 
advantage of being able to use WAA to identify and resolve ACP conflict. 
2. A system implementing WAAM would allow its administrators to quickly 
react to fixing the underlying issue of ACP conflicts proactively as they are 
encountered. 
3. One disadvantage of WAAM is that administrators of implementing systems 
must spend the time needed to implement WAAM into their administration 
model. 
4. Another disadvantage is that there would be an additional item the 
administrators have to monitor to ensure the best use experience for their 
users. They have to monitor the conflict logs produced by WAA. 
Research Question 2 
The question was: What are the advantages and disadvantages of an RBAC 
system adopting the WAA as part of their use authorization? 
1. The main advantage of adopting WAA is that the system will be able to 
resolve ACP conflicts for users as they get authorization to use the system. 
This would let users into the system while avoiding the anomalies that result 
from conflicted ACP. 
2. The other advantage is that administrators will have a list of the ACP conflicts 
from the logs generated by WAA. This would allow the administrators to use 
the data proactively instead of waiting for user complaints before correcting 
the conflicted ACPs. 
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3. A disadvantage of using WAA is that it adds a delay to the authorization 
process of 0.3502s on average. This delay of 0.3502s was observed using the 
simulation environment used for this study. It would be possible that the delay 
is negligible if the servers used for implementing systems are more powerful 
than the computer used for the simulation. 
4. The other disadvantage of using WAA is the administrators or implementers 
would have to include WAA into their system design and architecture which 
could prove challenging for systems already in use. 
Research Question 3 
The question was: Expecting the number of conflicts a systems user has to grow 
how would the proposed WAA resolve ACP conflicts? 
1. The WAAM allows for a growing number of users, roles, securable objects 
and the resultant ACP. The values used to calculate the WPA will be set up 
when adding roles or positions of users. WAA will use the available attributes 
during authorization which is limited to a user’s ACP. So while a system’s 
number of users and objects grow it is possible that the average number of 
ACPs a user has in the system may not grow as fast. The expectation is that 
WAA would continue to process ACPs without noticeable degradation in 
system performance during user authorization. 
2. The administrator would not be required to perform additional tasks beyond 
the attributes used to calculate WPA. So as the number of objects grows each 
new object will be assigned to at least one role in the hierarchy or at least one 
user will gain access to it. The ACP related to the new object will obtain its 
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attributes from the related user and role records to use for WPA. WAA has no 
restriction on the number of ACP it will process once implemented. 
3. The administrators have a choice in determining when to authorize a user: on 
each request, or once when the user authenticates. For best performance using 
WAA, authorizing a user once per session after authentication would be the 
recommendation but the administrator would have to decide what option best 
meets their security needs. The hope would be that as conflicts are identified 
for the administrator, corrective action is taken because the largest delay from 
WAA is in resolving the conflicts. 
4. The WAA is designed to work in compiled code and should be abstracted 
from the storage of the ACP. This allows for the horizontal scaling so that 
should there be a need to process more ACP an additional server instance 
could be acquired to provide the added computation without additional stress 
on the storage beyond basic retrieval for the ACPs.  
Recommendations and Future Research  
 This WAA could be run as-is buying administrators time to resolve any identified 
conflict while providing ACP free of conflicts from their system’s user authorization 
process. Implementing the WAAM and WAA would provide these benefits to the users 
and administrators of an RBAC-based system. The ACP conflicts encountered such as 
shown in Table 3 shows that the user was assigned roles with conflicting permissions to 
the same object. Some of the conflict had roles having the same hierarchy so WAA could 
not resolve the conflict because the WPA values were identical for the conflicted ACP. 
Looking at the data from the accuracy of resolving conflict, additional research would be 
65 
 
required to determine other options, including if different attributes could be used to 
increase the accuracy of the resolved conflicts from 96.98% closer to 100%.  Such 
attributes to be considered could be: time when the ACP was granted, or the physical 
location of a user. It may also be possible to study the use of the additional attributes and 
rules in an extension module to be used if an identified conflict cannot be resolved, or 
pass the conflicted ACP to a separate algorithm altogether.  
Implication 
The empirical data gathered from this investigation succinctly confirms that ACP 
conflicts in RBAC systems can be resolved by using WAA to resolve ACP conflicts. The 
structure of the data in the role hierarchy could influence the accuracy of resolving the 
conflict. If the hierarchical roles allow multiple root nodes, or have a flat hierarchy, the 
hierarchy attribute would be similar in many of the roles represented in a user’s ACPs. 
The administrators would have to alter the configurable WAA constants as appropriate 
and further, the role attributes in order to achieve desired WPA to resolve ACP conflict. 
The WAA is designed to be part of the authorization. This would cause a delay in 
the authorization when the algorithm runs but still benefits the users and administrators. 
If the delay added by implementing WAA in the authorization process is unacceptable, it 
could still be used periodically to check a system’s ACP health by identifying the 
conflicts. This would be similar to the automated approach to security analysis by 
Abdunabi and Ray (2010) whereby the algorithm is run separately from the authorization. 
Study Limitations 
Three limitations were identified in this study. The first limitation is that the 
results were produced from randomized data created via script. The results, if collected 
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from an actual system could vary what has been show in this study. The second limitation 
is that the simulation environment used only ran WAA during user authorization. 
Collecting the metrics from a fully functioning system would likely produce different 
results depending on availability of resources. Third, the simulation environment housed 
both WAA and WAAM on the same physical computer so the results may not be 
generalizable to DSE with nodes over a LAN/WAN.   
Summary 
 This dissertation has shown that it is indeed possible to have a solution that 
combines an administration model and an algorithm in resolving ACP conflict for large 
RBAC-based systems with hierarchical roles in a DSE. Following the studies by Fan et 
al. (2013) which provided the ACPCDM for conflict identification and Reeder et al. 
(2009) with conflict resolution in a file access environment without role hierarchy, the 
natural progression in combining the results of those two studies would bring conflict 
resolution to administering RBAC-based systems. 
Further, this study has shown that ACP conflicts can indeed be resolved in RBAC 
systems although not without challenges because 100% resolution accuracy was not 
achieved in all the runs. The algorithm could be extended to increase the resolution 
accuracy. It could be worth studying if 100% accuracy is an achievable limit in resolving 
ACP conflicts and whether the delay observed in resolving the conflicts can be lowered 
further. 
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Appendix A: Database Create Tables’ Script  
CREATE TABLE AcpConflictLog ( 
  LogTimeStamp DATETIME NOT NULL Default GetUtcDate(), 
  UserId INTEGER NOT NULL, 
  SecurableObjectId INTEGER NOT NULL, 
  RoleId INTEGER NULL 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE AuthenticationLog ( 
  LogTimeStamp DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT GetUtcDate(), 
  AcpCount INTEGER , 
  ConflictCount INTEGER, 
  ResolveSeconds money, 
  AuthenticationSeconds money 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE LuAccessMode ( 
  Id INTEGER NOT NULL, 
  Name VARCHAR NULL, 
  PRIMARY KEY(Id) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE Position ( 
  Id INTEGER NOT NULL Identity(1,1), 
  [Rank] INTEGER NULL, 
  Name VARCHAR NULL, 
  PRIMARY KEY(Id) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE [Role] ( 
  RoleId INTEGER NOT NULL Identity(1,1), 
  ParentRoleId INTEGER NOT NULL, 
  Name INTEGER NULL, 
  HierarchyLevel INTEGER NULL, 
  PRIMARY KEY(RoleId) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE RoleObject ( 
  LuAccessModeId INTEGER NOT NULL, 
  SecurableObjectId INTEGER NOT NULL, 
  RoleId INTEGER NOT NULL, 
  IsAutoResolved Bit Default 0, 
  PRIMARY KEY(RoleId, SecurableObjectId, LuAccessModeId) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE SecurableObject ( 
  SecurableObjectId INTEGER NOT NULL Identity(1,1), 
  Name VARCHAR NULL, 
  PRIMARY KEY(SecurableObjectId) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE UserRole ( 
  RoleId INTEGER NOT NULL, 
  UserId INTEGER NOT NULL 
); 
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CREATE TABLE UserSecurableObject ( 
  IsAutoResolved bit NOT NULL Default 0, 
  UserId INTEGER NOT NULL, 
  SecurableObjectId INTEGER NOT NULL, 
  LuAccessModeId INTEGER NOT NULL, 
  PRIMARY KEY(IsAutoResolved, UserId, SecurableObjectId) 
); 
 
CREATE TABLE [User] ( 
  UserId INTEGER NOT NULL Identity(1,1), 
  PositionId INTEGER NOT NULL, 
  UserName VARCHAR NULL, 
  FirstName VARCHAR NULL, 
  LastName VARCHAR NULL, 
  [Password] VARCHAR NULL, 
  PRIMARY KEY(UserId) 
); 
 
go 
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Appendix B: Database Create View Script 
 
CREATE view [dbo].[AccessControlPolicyVw] 
as 
 select u.UserId, u.UserName, p.PositionId, p.[Rank] 'PositionRank', 
so.SecurableObjectId, so.Name 'SecurableObjectName', am.Name 'AccessMode', 
uso.IsAutoResolved, 0 'HierarchyLevel', 
  0 'RoleId', p.Name 'PositionName', null 'RoleName' 
 from dbo.[User] u 
  join dbo.Position p on u.PositionId = p.PositionId 
  join dbo.UserSecurableObject uso on u.UserId = uso.UserId 
  join dbo.LuAccessMode am on uso.LuAccessModeId = am.LuAccessModeId 
  join dbo.SecurableObject so on uso.SecurableObjectId = 
so.SecurableObjectId 
 
 union 
 
 select u.UserId, u.UserName , p.PositionId, p.[Rank], so.SecurableObjectId, 
so.Name 'SecurableObjectName', am.Name 'AccessMode', ro.IsAutoResolved, 
rh.HierarchyLevel, 
  rh.DescendantRoleId, p.Name 'PositionName', r.Name 
  --, ur.RoleId 
 from dbo.[User] u 
  join dbo.Position p on u.PositionId = p.PositionId 
  join dbo.UserRole ur on u.UserId = ur.UserId 
  join dbo.[RoleHierarchy] rh on ur.RoleId = rh.RoleId 
  join dbo.RoleObject ro on rh.DescendantRoleId = ro.RoleId 
  join dbo.LuAccessMode am on ro.LuAccessModeId = am.LuAccessModeId 
  join dbo.SecurableObject so on ro.SecurableObjectId = 
so.SecurableObjectId 
  join dbo.[Role] r on rh.DescendantRoleId = r.RoleId 
   
GO 
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Appendix C: Database Create Stored Procedures’ Script  
CREATE procedure [dbo].[Role_readList] 
 @ParentRoleId int = null 
as 
 select RoleId, Name, ParentRoleId, HierarchyLevel 
 from [Role] 
 where ParentRoleId = ISNULL(@ParentRoleId, ParentRoleId) 
GO 
 
CREATE proc [dbo].[Role_read] 
( 
 @RoleId Int 
) 
as 
 
select [RoleId], [ParentRoleId], [HierarchyLevel], [Name] 
 from [Role] 
 where RoleId = @RoleId 
GO 
 
CREATE proc [dbo].[Role_insert] 
( 
 @RoleId Int,  
 @ParentRoleId Int = null,  
 @HierarchyLevel Int = null,  
 @Name Varchar(20) 
 
) 
as 
 
 INSERT INTO [dbo].[Role] 
 ( 
  ParentRoleId ,  
  HierarchyLevel ,  
  Name  
 ) 
 VALUES 
 ( 
@ParentRoleId ,  
@HierarchyLevel ,  
@Name  
 ) 
 
  select SCOPE_IDENTITY() 'RoleId' 
GO 
 
CREATE proc [dbo].[LuAccessMode_read] 
( 
 @LuAccessModeId Int 
) 
as 
 
 
 
 select [LuAccessModeId], [Name] 
 from [LuAccessMode] 
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 where LuAccessModeId = @LuAccessModeId 
GO 
 
CREATE proc [dbo].[LuAccessMode_insert] 
( 
 @LuAccessModeId Int,  
 @Name Varchar(20) 
 
) 
as 
 
 INSERT INTO [dbo].[LuAccessMode] 
 ( 
  Name  
 ) 
 VALUES 
 ( 
@Name  
 ) 
 
  select SCOPE_IDENTITY() 'LuAccessModeId' 
GO 
 
CREATE proc [dbo].[Position_read] 
( 
 @PositionId Int 
) 
as 
 
 select [PositionId], [Rank], [Name] 
 from [Position] 
 where PositionId = @PositionId 
GO 
 
CREATE proc [dbo].[Position_insert] 
( 
 @PositionId Int,  
 @Rank Int = null,  
 @Name Varchar(20) = null 
 
) 
as 
 
 INSERT INTO [dbo].[Position] 
 ( 
  Rank ,  
  Name  
 ) 
 VALUES 
 ( 
@Rank ,  
@Name  
 ) 
 
  select SCOPE_IDENTITY() 'PositionId' 
GO 
 
CREATE proc [dbo].[AuthenticationLog_read] 
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( 
 @LogTimeStamp Datetime,  
 @AcpCount Int = null,  
 @ConflictCount Int = null,  
 @ResolveSeconds Money = null,  
 @AuthenticationSeconds Money = null 
 
) 
as 
 
 
 
 select [LogTimeStamp], [AcpCount], [ConflictCount], [ResolveSeconds], 
[AuthenticationSeconds] 
 from [AuthenticationLog] 
GO 
 
CREATE proc [dbo].[AuthenticationLog_insert] 
( 
 @LogTimeStamp Datetime,  
 @AcpCount Int = null,  
 @ConflictCount Int = null,  
 @ResolveSeconds Money = null,  
 @AuthenticationSeconds Money = null 
 
) 
as 
 
 INSERT INTO [dbo].[AuthenticationLog] 
 ( 
  LogTimeStamp ,  
  AcpCount ,  
  ConflictCount ,  
  ResolveSeconds ,  
  AuthenticationSeconds  
 ) 
 VALUES 
 ( 
@LogTimeStamp ,  
@AcpCount ,  
@ConflictCount ,  
@ResolveSeconds ,  
@AuthenticationSeconds  
 ) 
GO 
 
CREATE proc [dbo].[AcpConflictLog_read] 
( 
 @LogTimeStamp Datetime,  
 @UserId Int,  
 @SecurableObjectId Int,  
 @RoleId Int = null 
 
) 
as 
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 select [LogTimeStamp], [UserId], [SecurableObjectId], [RoleId] 
 from [AcpConflictLog] 
GO 
 
CREATE proc [dbo].[AcpConflictLog_insert] 
( 
 @LogTimeStamp Datetime,  
 @UserId Int,  
 @SecurableObjectId Int,  
 @RoleId Int = null 
 
) 
as 
 
 
 INSERT INTO [dbo].[AcpConflictLog] 
 ( 
  LogTimeStamp ,  
  UserId ,  
  SecurableObjectId ,  
  RoleId  
 ) 
 VALUES 
 ( 
@LogTimeStamp ,  
@UserId ,  
@SecurableObjectId ,  
@RoleId  
 ) 
GO 
 
CREATE proc [dbo].[RoleHierarchy_read] 
( 
 @RoleId Int,  
 @DescendantRoleId Int,  
 @HierarchyLevel Smallint 
 
) 
as 
 
 select [RoleId], [DescendantRoleId], [HierarchyLevel] 
 from [RoleHierarchy] 
GO 
 
CREATE proc [dbo].[RoleHierarchy_insert] 
( 
 @RoleId Int,  
 @DescendantRoleId Int,  
 @HierarchyLevel Smallint 
 
) 
as 
 
 INSERT INTO [dbo].[RoleHierarchy] 
 ( 
  RoleId ,  
  DescendantRoleId ,  
  HierarchyLevel  
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 ) 
 VALUES 
 ( 
@RoleId ,  
@DescendantRoleId ,  
@HierarchyLevel  
 ) 
GO 
 
CREATE proc [dbo].[SecurableObject_read] 
( 
 @SecurableObjectId Int 
) 
as 
 
 select  
[SecurableObjectId], [Name] 
 from [SecurableObject] 
 where SecurableObjectId = @SecurableObjectId 
GO 
 
CREATE proc [dbo].[SecurableObject_insert] 
( 
 @SecurableObjectId Int,  
 @Name Varchar(20) 
 
) 
as 
 
 
 INSERT INTO [dbo].[SecurableObject] 
 ( 
  Name  
 ) 
 VALUES 
 ( 
@Name  
 ) 
 
  select SCOPE_IDENTITY() 'SecurableObjectId' 
GO 
 
CREATE proc [dbo].[RoleObject_read] 
( 
 @LuAccessModeId Int,  
 @SecurableObjectId Int,  
 @RoleId Int,  
 @IsAutoResolved Bit = null 
 
) 
as 
 
 select  
[LuAccessModeId], [SecurableObjectId], [RoleId], [IsAutoResolved] 
 from [RoleObject] 
GO 
 
CREATE proc [dbo].[RoleObject_insert] 
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( 
 @LuAccessModeId Int,  
 @SecurableObjectId Int,  
 @RoleId Int,  
 @IsAutoResolved Bit = null 
 
) 
as 
 
 INSERT INTO [dbo].[RoleObject] 
 ( 
  LuAccessModeId ,  
  SecurableObjectId ,  
  RoleId ,  
  IsAutoResolved  
 ) 
 VALUES 
 ( 
@LuAccessModeId ,  
@SecurableObjectId ,  
@RoleId ,  
@IsAutoResolved  
 ) 
GO 
 
create proc [dbo].[User_readByUsername] 
 @UserName varchar(20) 
as 
SELECT [UserId] 
      ,[PositionId] 
      ,[UserName] 
      ,[FirstName] 
      ,[LastName] 
      ,[Password] 
  FROM [dbo].[User] 
  where UserName = @UserName 
GO 
 
CREATE proc [dbo].[User_read] 
( 
 @UserId Int 
) 
as 
 
 
 
 select  
[UserId], [PositionId], [UserName], [FirstName], [LastName], [Password] 
 from [User] 
 where UserId = @UserId 
GO 
 
CREATE proc [dbo].[User_insert] 
( 
 @UserId Int,  
 @PositionId Int,  
 @UserName Varchar(20),  
 @FirstName Varchar(20),  
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 @LastName Varchar(20),  
 @Password Varchar(20) 
 
) 
as 
 
 
 INSERT INTO [dbo].[User] 
 ( 
  PositionId ,  
  UserName ,  
  FirstName ,  
  LastName ,  
  Password  
 ) 
 VALUES 
 ( 
@PositionId ,  
@UserName ,  
@FirstName ,  
@LastName ,  
@Password  
 ) 
 
  select SCOPE_IDENTITY() 'UserId' 
GO 
 
CREATE proc [dbo].[UserSecurableObject_read] 
( 
 @IsAutoResolved Bit,  
 @UserId Int,  
 @SecurableObjectId Int,  
 @LuAccessModeId Int 
 
) 
as 
 
 
 
 select  
[IsAutoResolved], [UserId], [SecurableObjectId], [LuAccessModeId] 
 from [UserSecurableObject] 
GO 
 
CREATE proc [dbo].[UserSecurableObject_insert] 
( 
 @IsAutoResolved Bit,  
 @UserId Int,  
 @SecurableObjectId Int,  
 @LuAccessModeId Int 
 
) 
as 
 
 
 INSERT INTO [dbo].[UserSecurableObject] 
 ( 
  IsAutoResolved ,  
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  UserId ,  
  SecurableObjectId ,  
  LuAccessModeId  
 ) 
 VALUES 
 ( 
@IsAutoResolved ,  
@UserId ,  
@SecurableObjectId ,  
@LuAccessModeId  
 ) 
GO 
 
CREATE proc [dbo].[UserRole_read] 
( 
 @RoleId Int,  
 @UserId Int 
 
) 
as 
 
 select [RoleId], [UserId] 
 from [UserRole] 
GO 
 
CREATE proc [dbo].[UserRole_insert] 
( 
 @RoleId Int,  
 @UserId Int 
 
) 
as 
 
 
 INSERT INTO [dbo].[UserRole] 
 ( 
  RoleId ,  
  UserId  
 ) 
 VALUES 
 ( 
@RoleId ,  
@UserId  
 ) 
GO 
 
CREATE proc [dbo].[AccessControlPolicyVw_read] 
( 
 @UserId int 
 , @SecurableObjectId int = null 
) 
as 
 select  
  UserId, UserName, SecurableObjectId, SecurableObjectName, 
AccessMode, IsAutoResolved 
 from AccessControlPolicyVw 
 where UserId = @UserId 
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  and SecurableObjectId = IsNull(@SecurableObjectId, 
SecurableObjectId) 
GO 
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Appendix D: Tools and Components for Weighted Attribute 
Algorithm Implementation  
1. A Microsoft Windows computer with the following specifications: 
a. Operating system: Windows 8.1 Pro 
b. Memory: 8GB RAM 
c. Processor: 4GHz (Intel CORE i7) 
d. Model: ASUS Q550L 
2. Microsoft SQL Server Management Studio using SQL Server Express to create 
manage the relational database and run T-SQL scripts 
3. Visual Studio 2012 IDE for the development environment using C# programming 
language. 
4. Microsoft System components: 
a. ADO.Net containing System.Data and System.Data.SqlClient for data 
access. 
b. System.Generic.Collection for management of object lists 
c. System.Linq for lambda expressions on the lists 
d. Microsoft.VisualStudio.QualityTools.UnitTestFramework – for creating 
and running the unit tests for the runs through the simulation. 
  
85 
 
Appendix E: Authorization Log from Running the Weighted 
Attribute Algorithm 
ACP 
Count 
Known 
Conflicts 
Conflicts 
Identified 
Conflicts 
Resolved 
Time to Identify 
Conflicts (Seconds) 
Time to Resolve 
Conflicts (Seconds) 
69 7 7 7 0.0002 0.0552 
77 8 8 8 0.0003 0.0713 
80 12 12 12 0.0003 0.0957 
81 12 12 12 0.0003 0.1049 
86 16 16 15 0.0001 0.0775 
86 11 11 10 0.0004 0.0906 
88 11 11 11 0.0001 0.0394 
93 18 18 18 0.0001 0.067 
95 17 17 13 0.0002 0.1219 
95 11 11 10 0.0004 0.0888 
100 19 19 19 0.0005 0.146 
100 22 22 20 0.0008 0.1751 
103 18 18 16 0.0002 0.0574 
104 14 14 13 0.0005 0.114 
104 21 21 17 0.0002 0.0645 
105 17 17 17 0.0009 0.1659 
108 16 16 16 0.0002 0.0516 
112 17 17 17 0.0004 0.0598 
119 18 18 18 0.0002 0.0607 
124 25 25 25 0.0007 0.1987 
125 24 24 24 0.0011 0.1909 
131 36 36 34 0.0004 0.1022 
132 18 18 17 0.0003 0.0535 
132 28 28 28 0.0004 0.0786 
135 31 31 30 0.0003 0.1126 
135 31 31 30 0.0008 0.2573 
137 28 28 25 0.0003 0.0973 
138 27 27 22 0.0009 0.1356 
141 33 33 32 0.0009 0.2679 
143 33 33 32 0.0003 0.2403 
146 35 35 35 0.001 0.2952 
146 33 33 30 0.0003 0.1185 
148 41 41 41 0.001 0.3395 
150 34 34 32 0.0004 0.0976 
150 33 33 31 0.0009 0.2763 
158 38 38 37 0.0006 0.1204 
159 37 37 36 0.0011 0.2906 
164 47 47 44 0.0012 0.1693 
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ACP 
Count 
Known 
Conflicts 
Conflicts 
Identified 
Conflicts 
Resolved 
Time to Identify 
Conflicts (Seconds) 
Time to Resolve 
Conflicts (Seconds) 
165 40 40 38 0.0004 0.1827 
165 37 37 36 0.0012 0.2989 
168 43 43 42 0.0012 0.3502 
171 36 36 34 0.0006 0.1206 
172 40 40 40 0.0013 0.3343 
172 45 45 44 0.0004 0.1349 
172 41 41 39 0.0013 0.2885 
175 47 47 46 0.0014 0.256 
179 41 41 38 0.0004 0.145 
179 45 45 42 0.0022 0.1701 
180 42 42 40 0.0004 0.1248 
182 44 44 38 0.0005 0.1718 
182 46 46 44 0.0015 0.34 
188 55 55 50 0.0019 0.513 
189 48 48 47 0.0004 0.3767 
193 48 48 46 0.0004 0.3331 
195 55 55 53 0.0006 0.4292 
196 52 52 51 0.0005 0.1556 
202 52 52 50 0.0008 0.1758 
203 53 53 52 0.0005 0.2829 
204 53 53 53 0.0006 0.2978 
204 55 55 52 0.0005 0.424 
209 62 62 58 0.0033 0.4511 
210 60 60 58 0.0005 0.1705 
211 51 51 49 0.0019 0.2266 
219 58 58 53 0.0025 0.4448 
220 57 57 56 0.0006 0.4195 
221 60 60 57 0.0006 0.3612 
224 56 56 55 0.0074 0.3327 
228 62 62 59 0.0028 0.5021 
239 65 65 63 0.0008 0.4076 
240 70 70 68 0.0013 0.2306 
244 66 66 62 0.0007 0.4061 
245 67 67 63 0.0008 0.4149 
249 65 65 64 0.0036 0.5126 
252 70 70 70 0.0007 0.5885 
252 72 72 68 0.0009 0.567 
253 77 77 75 0.0028 0.5155 
270 74 74 72 0.003 0.5435 
272 81 81 78 0.0034 0.5702 
273 84 84 83 0.0017 0.4215 
280 77 77 77 0.0043 0.38 
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ACP 
Count 
Known 
Conflicts 
Conflicts 
Identified 
Conflicts 
Resolved 
Time to Identify 
Conflicts (Seconds) 
Time to Resolve 
Conflicts (Seconds) 
282 73 73 71 0.0032 0.5721 
288 84 84 78 0.0009 0.6423 
290 87 87 84 0.0036 0.4969 
290 90 90 83 0.001 0.7252 
299 89 89 86 0.0011 0.2755 
312 95 95 92 0.0044 0.528 
318 96 96 92 0.0042 0.6575 
320 96 96 96 0.005 0.4001 
323 98 98 94 0.0012 0.3054 
339 96 96 96 0.0012 0.4922 
340 104 104 102 0.0049 0.5949 
356 102 102 100 0.0048 0.6007 
360 114 114 113 0.0084 0.5417 
816 199 199 197 0.0075 1.1521 
839 199 199 197 0.0062 1.41 
854 199 199 197 0.0253 1.2242 
880 199 199 197 0.0106 1.0236 
900 199 199 197 0.0065 1.3274 
928 199 199 197 0.0067 1.169 
964 199 199 197 0.0316 1.1348 
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Appendix F: Authorization Log from Runs through ACPCDM  
ACP 
Count 
Known 
Conflicts 
Conflicts 
Identified  
Time Taken to Identify 
Conflicts (Seconds) 
69 7 7 0.0003 
77 8 8 0.0003 
80 12 12 0.0001 
81 12 12 0.0005 
86 16 16 0.0004 
86 11 11 0.0004 
88 11 11 0.0001 
93 18 18 0.0001 
95 17 17 0.0001 
95 11 11 0.0004 
100 19 19 0.0001 
100 22 22 0.0002 
103 18 18 0.0001 
104 21 21 0.0001 
104 14 14 0.0002 
105 17 17 0.0001 
108 16 16 0.0009 
112 17 17 0.0003 
119 18 18 0.0002 
124 25 25 0.0007 
125 24 24 0.0007 
131 36 36 0.0002 
132 18 18 0.0012 
132 28 28 0.0002 
135 31 31 0.0008 
135 31 31 0.0002 
137 28 28 0.0002 
138 27 27 0.0008 
141 33 33 0.0002 
143 33 33 0.0009 
146 35 35 0.0009 
146 33 33 0.0002 
148 41 41 0.0002 
150 33 33 0.0016 
150 34 34 0.0004 
158 38 38 0.0003 
159 37 37 0.0011 
164 47 47 0.0015 
165 40 40 0.0004 
165 37 37 0.0012 
168 43 43 0.0012 
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ACP 
Count 
Known 
Conflicts 
Conflicts 
Identified  
Time Taken to Identify 
Conflicts (Seconds) 
171 36 36 0.002 
172 45 45 0.0019 
172 40 40 0.0003 
172 41 41 0.0004 
175 47 47 0.0015 
179 41 41 0.0004 
179 45 45 0.0004 
180 42 42 0.0004 
182 46 46 0.0004 
182 44 44 0.0018 
188 55 55 0.0004 
189 48 48 0.0015 
193 48 48 0.0066 
195 55 55 0.0005 
196 52 52 0.0016 
202 52 52 0.0017 
203 53 53 0.0005 
204 53 53 0.0017 
204 55 55 0.002 
209 62 62 0.0011 
210 60 60 0.0027 
211 51 51 0.0023 
219 58 58 0.002 
220 57 57 0.0021 
221 60 60 0.0006 
224 56 56 0.003 
228 62 62 0.0007 
239 65 65 0.0034 
240 70 70 0.0006 
244 66 66 0.0025 
245 67 67 0.0012 
249 65 65 0.0031 
252 70 70 0.0007 
252 72 72 0.0009 
253 77 77 0.0028 
270 74 74 0.0034 
272 81 81 0.0009 
273 84 84 0.001 
280 77 77 0.004 
282 73 73 0.001 
288 84 84 0.0009 
290 87 87 0.0034 
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ACP 
Count 
Known 
Conflicts 
Conflicts 
Identified  
Time Taken to Identify 
Conflicts (Seconds) 
290 90 90 0.0034 
299 89 89 0.001 
312 95 95 0.0053 
318 96 96 0.0041 
320 96 96 0.0042 
323 98 98 0.0011 
339 96 96 0.0046 
340 104 104 0.0012 
356 102 102 0.0019 
360 114 114 0.0055 
816 199 199 0.0057 
839 199 199 0.0059 
854 199 199 0.006 
880 199 199 0.0064 
900 199 199 0.0295 
928 199 199 0.0284 
964 199 199 0.0072 
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Appendix G: List of a User’s ACP used by WAA  
Object 
Id 
Object 
Name 
Access 
Mode 
Is Auto 
Resolved 
Position 
Rank 
Position 
Name 
Role 
Name 
Hierarchy 
Level 
2 Object -   2 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  81 2 
5 Object -   5 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  45 1 
6 Object -   6 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  71 1 
6 Object -   6 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  85 4 
6 Object -   6 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  86 1 
9 Object -   9 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  35 1 
10 Object -  10 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  75 3 
10 Object -  10 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  62 1 
12 Object -  12 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  86 1 
15 Object -  15 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  91 3 
16 Object -  16 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  33 1 
19 Object -  19 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  96 1 
20 Object -  20 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  21 1 
21 Object -  21 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  61 1 
22 Object -  22 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  45 1 
23 Object -  23 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  85 4 
24 Object -  24 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  82 3 
26 Object -  26 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  91 3 
28 Object -  28 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  15 1 
28 Object -  28 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  72 2 
29 Object -  29 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  55 1 
30 Object -  30 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  25 1 
30 Object -  30 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  82 3 
30 Object -  30 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  95 5 
31 Object -  31 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  65 2 
32 Object -  32 Full 1 2 Executive Role -   4 1 
34 Object -  34 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  15 1 
35 Object -  35 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  55 1 
36 Object -  36 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  52 1 
36 Object -  36 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  95 5 
37 Object -  37 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  92 4 
38 Object -  38 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  21 1 
39 Object -  39 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  61 1 
41 Object -  41 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  81 2 
44 Object -  44 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  86 1 
45 Object -  45 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  71 1 
48 Object -  48 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  75 3 
48 Object -  48 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  35 1 
48 Object -  48 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  91 3 
49 Object -  49 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  62 1 
53 Object -  53 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  52 1 
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Object 
Id 
Object 
Name 
Access 
Mode 
Is Auto 
Resolved 
Position 
Rank 
Position 
Name 
Role 
Name 
Hierarchy 
Level 
54 Object -  54 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  92 4 
55 Object -  55 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  33 1 
58 Object -  58 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  96 1 
60 Object -  60 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  62 1 
61 Object -  61 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  45 1 
62 Object -  62 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  85 4 
62 Object -  62 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  82 3 
63 Object -  63 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  25 1 
64 Object -  64 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  65 2 
65 Object -  65 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  35 1 
65 Object -  65 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  91 3 
66 Object -  66 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  72 2 
66 Object -  66 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  75 3 
67 Object -  67 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  15 1 
68 Object -  68 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  55 1 
69 Object -  69 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  95 5 
70 Object -  70 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  21 1 
71 Object -  71 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -   4 1 
71 Object -  71 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  61 1 
77 Object -  77 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  21 1 
78 Object -  78 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  61 1 
78 Object -  78 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  71 1 
80 Object -  80 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  25 1 
80 Object -  80 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  82 3 
81 Object -  81 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  65 2 
82 Object -  82 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  62 1 
84 Object -  84 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  15 1 
84 Object -  84 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  72 2 
85 Object -  85 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  55 1 
86 Object -  86 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  52 1 
86 Object -  86 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  95 5 
87 Object -  87 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  33 1 
87 Object -  87 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  91 3 
87 Object -  87 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  92 4 
88 Object -  88 Read 1 2 Executive Role -   4 1 
90 Object -  90 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  96 1 
93 Object -  93 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  45 1 
94 Object -  94 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  85 4 
95 Object -  95 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  71 1 
96 Object -  96 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  96 1 
98 Object -  98 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  35 1 
98 Object -  98 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  75 3 
99 Object -  99 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  62 1 
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Object 
Id 
Object 
Name 
Access 
Mode 
Is Auto 
Resolved 
Position 
Rank 
Position 
Name 
Role 
Name 
Hierarchy 
Level 
101 Object - 101 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  82 3 
102 Object - 102 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  25 1 
103 Object - 103 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  65 2 
104 Object - 104 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  91 3 
104 Object - 104 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  33 1 
105 Object - 105 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  72 2 
106 Object - 106 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  15 1 
107 Object - 107 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  55 1 
107 Object - 107 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  52 1 
108 Object - 108 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  95 5 
108 Object - 108 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  96 1 
108 Object - 108 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  92 4 
109 Object - 109 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  21 1 
110 Object - 110 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  61 1 
110 Object - 110 Read 1 2 Executive Role -   4 1 
111 Object - 111 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  45 1 
112 Object - 112 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  82 3 
112 Object - 112 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  81 2 
112 Object - 112 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  85 4 
113 Object - 113 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  25 1 
114 Object - 114 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  65 2 
116 Object - 116 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  71 1 
116 Object - 116 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  72 2 
117 Object - 117 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  15 1 
118 Object - 118 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  55 1 
119 Object - 119 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  25 1 
119 Object - 119 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  35 1 
119 Object - 119 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  95 5 
120 Object - 120 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  65 2 
120 Object - 120 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  75 3 
121 Object - 121 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  62 1 
125 Object - 125 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  52 1 
126 Object - 126 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  92 4 
126 Object - 126 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  33 1 
127 Object - 127 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  21 1 
127 Object - 127 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  61 1 
129 Object - 129 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  96 1 
132 Object - 132 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  45 1 
132 Object - 132 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  62 1 
133 Object - 133 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  85 4 
134 Object - 134 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  71 1 
136 Object - 136 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  35 1 
137 Object - 137 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  75 3 
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Object 
Id 
Object 
Name 
Access 
Mode 
Is Auto 
Resolved 
Position 
Rank 
Position 
Name 
Role 
Name 
Hierarchy 
Level 
137 Object - 137 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  91 3 
138 Object - 138 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  62 1 
138 Object - 138 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  72 2 
142 Object - 142 Full 1 2 Executive Role -   4 1 
143 Object - 143 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  33 1 
146 Object - 146 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  96 1 
148 Object - 148 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  21 1 
149 Object - 149 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  61 1 
150 Object - 150 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  45 1 
150 Object - 150 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  85 4 
151 Object - 151 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  82 3 
152 Object - 152 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  65 2 
152 Object - 152 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  25 1 
154 Object - 154 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  91 3 
155 Object - 155 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  72 2 
156 Object - 156 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  15 1 
157 Object - 157 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  55 1 
157 Object - 157 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  95 5 
160 Object - 160 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -   4 1 
163 Object - 163 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  52 1 
164 Object - 164 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  92 4 
166 Object - 166 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  71 1 
168 Object - 168 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  81 2 
170 Object - 170 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  62 1 
172 Object - 172 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  86 1 
175 Object - 175 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  35 1 
175 Object - 175 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  91 3 
176 Object - 176 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  33 1 
176 Object - 176 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  75 3 
179 Object - 179 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  96 1 
182 Object - 182 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  45 1 
183 Object - 183 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  85 4 
187 Object - 187 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  21 1 
187 Object - 187 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  91 3 
188 Object - 188 Deny 0 2 Executive 
 
0 
188 Object - 188 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  61 1 
188 Object - 188 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  62 1 
190 Object - 190 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  25 1 
190 Object - 190 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  82 3 
191 Object - 191 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  65 2 
192 Object - 192 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  62 1 
193 Object - 193 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  91 3 
194 Object - 194 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  72 2 
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Object 
Id 
Object 
Name 
Access 
Mode 
Is Auto 
Resolved 
Position 
Rank 
Position 
Name 
Role 
Name 
Hierarchy 
Level 
195 Object - 195 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  55 1 
195 Object - 195 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  15 1 
196 Object - 196 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  52 1 
196 Object - 196 Full 1 2 Executive Role -  95 5 
197 Object - 197 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  33 1 
197 Object - 197 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  92 4 
198 Object - 198 Read 1 2 Executive Role -  21 1 
199 Object - 199 Deny 1 2 Executive Role -  61 1 
199 Object - 199 Read 1 2 Executive Role -   4 1 
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Appendix H: Code to Generate the Data for the Simulation  
using System; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.IO; 
using System.Linq; 
using System.Text; 
using System.Threading.Tasks; 
using KibwageDis.SqlData.Entities; 
 
namespace KibwageDis.DataCreator 
{ 
    class Maxes 
    { 
        public int AcpRole = 800; 
        public int AcpUser = 200; 
        public int Objects = 200; 
        public int Roles = 100; 
        public int Users = 500; 
    } 
 
    class Program 
    { 
        static void Main(string[] args) 
        { 
            string fileName = 
System.Configuration.ConfigurationManager.AppSettings["output"]  + "gr.sql"; 
            if (File.Exists(fileName)) File.Delete(fileName); 
            File.AppendAllText(fileName, TableNameDeletes()); 
            var mo = new MasterObject() { Max = new Maxes() }; 
            mo.Objects = DataObjects(fileName, mo.Max.Objects); // 200 records 
            mo.Roles = DataRoles(fileName, mo.Max.Roles);     // 100 
            DataAcpsByRole(fileName, mo);             // 950 
            mo.Users = DataUsers(fileName, mo.Max.Users);     // 500 
            DataUserRoles(fileName, mo); 
            DataAcpsByUser(fileName, mo); 
        } 
 
        private static void DataAcpsByUser(string fileName, MasterObject mo) 
        { 
            File.AppendAllText(fileName, Environment.NewLine + "-- ACPs by user" + 
Environment.NewLine); 
            int acpCount = 0; 
            var rnd = new Random(); 
            while (acpCount++ < mo.Max.AcpUser) 
            { 
                int uid = rnd.Next(1, mo.Users.Count); 
                var user = mo.Users.Find(u => u.UserId == uid); 
                int oid = rnd.Next(1, mo.Objects.Count); 
                var secObject = mo.Objects.Find(o => o.SecurableObjectId == oid); 
                var userObject = new UserSecurableObject 
                { 
                    IsAutoResolved = (acpCount % 5 != 0), 
                    LuAccessModeId = (acpCount % 3 + 1), 
                    SecurableObjectId = secObject.SecurableObjectId, 
                    UserId = user.UserId 
                }; 
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                string line = string.Format(@"INSERT INTO 
[dbo].[UserSecurableObject] 
([IsAutoResolved],[UserId],[SecurableObjectId],[LuAccessModeId]) VALUES({0}, 
{1},{2},{3}); 
", 
userObject.IsAutoResolved ? 1 : 0, userObject.UserId, 
userObject.SecurableObjectId, userObject.LuAccessModeId); 
                File.AppendAllText(fileName, line); 
            } 
 
            if (acpCount < 50) 
                foreach (var user in mo.Users.FindAll(u => u.PositionId < 3)) 
                { 
                    foreach (var secObject in mo.Objects) 
                    { 
                        var userObject = new UserSecurableObject 
                        { 
                            IsAutoResolved = (acpCount % 5 != 0), 
                            LuAccessModeId = (acpCount % 3 + 1), 
                            SecurableObjectId = secObject.SecurableObjectId, 
                            UserId = user.UserId 
                        }; 
                        string line = string.Format(@"INSERT INTO 
[dbo].[UserSecurableObject] 
([IsAutoResolved],[UserId],[SecurableObjectId],[LuAccessModeId]) VALUES({0}, 
{1},{2},{3}); 
", 
     userObject.IsAutoResolved ? 1 : 0, userObject.UserId, 
userObject.SecurableObjectId, userObject.LuAccessModeId); 
                        File.AppendAllText(fileName, line); 
                        if (acpCount++ > 50) 
                            return; 
                    } 
 
                } 
        } 
 
        private static void DataUserRoles(string fileName, MasterObject mo) 
        { 
            var rnd = new Random(); 
            int acpCount = 0; 
            var urs = new List<UserRole>(); 
            foreach (var user in mo.Users) 
            { 
                // set roles for the user 
                int roleCount = rnd.Next(6, 12); 
                for (int i = 0; i < roleCount; i++) 
                { 
                    var role = mo.Roles[rnd.Next(mo.Roles.Count)]; 
                    var ur = new UserRole { RoleId = role.RoleId, UserId = 
user.UserId }; 
                    if (!urs.Exists(u => u.RoleId == ur.RoleId && u.UserId == 
ur.UserId)) 
                    { 
                        urs.Add(ur); 
                        string line = string.Format("INSERT INTO [dbo].[UserRole] 
([RoleId],[UserId]) VALUES ({0},{1});\n", ur.RoleId, ur.UserId); 
                        File.AppendAllText(fileName, line); 
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                        acpCount++; 
                        Console.WriteLine("Acp {0}", acpCount); 
                    } 
                } 
            } 
 
        } 
 
        class MasterObject 
        { 
            public List<Role> Roles { get; set; } 
            public List<SecurableObject> Objects { get; set; } 
            public List<User> Users { get; set; } 
 
            public Maxes Max { get; set; } 
        } 
 
        private static List<SecurableObject> DataObjects(string fileName, int max) 
        { 
            File.AppendAllText(fileName, TableNameIdStart(Ts.SecObj)); 
            // create objects 
            var items = new List<SecurableObject>(); 
            for (int i = 1; i < max + 1; i++) 
            { 
                var role = new KibwageDis.SqlData.Entities.SecurableObject { 
SecurableObjectId = i, Name = NameGet("Object", i) }; 
                items.Add(role); 
                string line = string.Format("INSERT INTO [dbo].[SecurableObject] 
(SecurableObjectId, [Name]) VALUES ({0}, '{1}');\r", 
                    role.SecurableObjectId, role.Name); 
                File.AppendAllText(fileName, line); 
 
            } 
            File.AppendAllText(fileName, TableNameIdStop(Ts.SecObj)); 
            return items; 
        } 
 
        private static List<Role> DataRoles(string fileName, int max) 
        { 
            var items = new List<Role>(); 
            File.AppendAllText(fileName, TableNameIdStart(Ts.Role)); 
            // create roles 
            for (int i = 1; i < max + 1; i++) 
            { 
                var role = new KibwageDis.SqlData.Entities.Role { RoleId = i, 
HierarchyLevel = 1, ParentRoleId = 0, Name = NameGet("Role", i) }; 
                if (i > 1) 
                    role.ParentRoleId = 1; 
                if (i > 14) 
                    role.ParentRoleId = i - 10; 
                if (i > 30) 
                    role.ParentRoleId = i - 20; 
                if (i > 40) 
                    role.ParentRoleId = (i % 10) + 10; 
                if (i > 60) 
                    role.ParentRoleId = i - 10; 
                items.Add(role); 
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                string line = string.Format("INSERT INTO [dbo].[Role] (RoleId, 
[ParentRoleId],[HierarchyLevel] ,[Name]) VALUES ({0}, {1}, {2}, '{3}');\r", 
                    role.RoleId, role.ParentRoleId == 0 ? "null" : 
role.ParentRoleId.ToString(), role.HierarchyLevel, role.Name); 
                File.AppendAllText(fileName, line); 
            } 
            File.AppendAllText(fileName, TableNameIdStop(Ts.Role)); 
            return items; 
        } 
 
        private static List<User> DataUsers(string fileName, int max) 
        { 
            var items = new List<User>(); 
            File.AppendAllText(fileName, TableNameIdStart(Ts.User)); 
            // create roles 
            for (int i = 1; i < max + 1; i++) 
            { 
                var role = new KibwageDis.SqlData.Entities.User { FirstName = "Fn 
" + i.ToString(), LastName = "Ln " + i.ToString(), 
                    Password= "qweNM<123", UserName = NameGet("User", i), UserId = 
i, PositionId = 5 }; 
                if (i % 20 == 4) 
                    role.PositionId = 3; 
                if (i % 40 == 6) 
                    role.PositionId = 4; 
                if (i % 50 == 2) 
                    role.PositionId = 2; 
                if (i % 100 == 5) 
                    role.PositionId = 1; 
                items.Add(role); 
                string line = string.Format("INSERT INTO [dbo].[User] (UserId, 
[PositionId] ,[UserName] ,[FirstName] ,[LastName] ,[Password]) VALUES ({0}, {1}, 
'{2}', '{3}', '{4}', '{5}');\r", 
                    role.UserId, role.PositionId == 0 ? "null" : 
role.PositionId.ToString(), role.UserName, role.FirstName, role.LastName, 
role.Password); 
                File.AppendAllText(fileName, line); 
            } 
            File.AppendAllText(fileName, TableNameIdStop(Ts.User)); 
            return items; 
        } 
 
        private static void DataAcpsByRole(string fileName, MasterObject mo) 
        { 
            File.AppendAllText(fileName, Environment.NewLine + "-- ACPs by role" + 
Environment.NewLine); 
            // create roles 
            var acps = new List<KibwageDis.SqlData.Entities.RoleObject>(); 
            foreach (var role in mo.Roles) 
            { 
                // get how many objects the role should have access to 
                //int maxObjects = Math.Min(15, (new Random()).Next(1, 
mo.Objects.Count)); 
                int maxObjects = (new Random()).Next(4, 12); 
                Console.WriteLine("Role {0} MaxObjects {1}", role.RoleId, 
maxObjects); 
                int objectCount = 0; 
                while(objectCount < maxObjects) 
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                { 
                    int oid = (new Random()).Next(1, mo.Objects.Count); 
                    var obj = mo.Objects.Find(o => o.SecurableObjectId == oid); 
                    var acp = new KibwageDis.SqlData.Entities.RoleObject 
                    { 
                        IsAutoResolved = true, 
                        LuAccessModeId = (acps.Count % 3 +1), // get only Read, 
Write, Deny 
                        RoleId = role.RoleId,                         
                        SecurableObjectId = obj.SecurableObjectId 
                    }; 
 
                    if (acps.Exists(ro => ro.RoleId == acp.RoleId && 
ro.SecurableObjectId == acp.SecurableObjectId)) 
                        continue; // skip because the ACP is already in the system 
and insert will fail 
 
                    string line = string.Format(@"INSERT INTO [dbo].[RoleObject] 
([LuAccessModeId], [SecurableObjectId], [RoleId],[IsAutoResolved]) VALUES ({0}, 
{1}, {2}, {3}); 
", 
                        acp.LuAccessModeId, acp.SecurableObjectId, acp.RoleId, 
acp.IsAutoResolved ? 1 : 0); 
 
                    if (acps.Count < mo.Max.AcpRole + 1) 
                    { 
                        objectCount++; 
                        acps.Add(acp); 
                        File.AppendAllText(fileName, line); 
                    } 
                    else break; 
                } 
            } 
            File.AppendAllText(fileName, Environment.NewLine); 
        } 
 
        private struct Ts 
        { 
            public const string  
                Role = "Role", 
                SecObj = "SecurableObject", 
                User = "[User]"; 
        } 
        private static string TableNameDeletes() 
        { 
            string retVal = @" 
delete from dbo.RoleObject 
delete from dbo.[UserRole] 
delete from [dbo].[UserSecurableObject] 
delete from dbo.SecurableObject 
delete from dbo.[Role] 
delete from dbo.[User] 
 
"; 
            return retVal; 
        } 
 
        private static string TableNameIdStart(string tableName) 
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        { 
            string retVal = string.Format(@" 
set IDENTITY_INSERT dbo.{0} on 
", tableName); 
            return retVal; 
        } 
 
        private static string TableNameIdStop(string tableName) 
        { 
            string retVal = string.Format(@"set IDENTITY_INSERT dbo.{0} off 
", tableName); 
            return retVal; 
        } 
 
        private static string NameGet(string tableName, int i) 
        { 
            string retVal = string.Format("{0} -{1,4}", tableName, i); 
            return retVal; 
        } 
    } 
 
} 
 
